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Nigeria has experienced high economic growth over the last 15 years. Hailed as the 
“Giant of Africa,” the Economist confirmed in 2014 that Nigeria had the largest gross 
domestic product in the continent. Yet, after more than a decade of sustained growth 
using international metrics of measurement, the country has exhibited dismal 
performance across multiple measures of development, security, and democratic 
governance due to the mismanagement of its economic resources. The majority of 
Nigerians attest to this in successive Afrobarometer Network and Transparency 
International surveys conducted between 2008 and 2014. This thesis acknowledges these 
facts but draws the reader into an equally important exploration of the role of the masses 
and civil society in engendering democratic governance. The underlying premise is that 
civil society can play a role in facilitating representative governance, especially as it 
relates to service delivery and the Nigerian populace’s security. The thesis posits that 
civil society has been handicapped in its ability to fulfill this charter for three distinct 
reasons: weakened traditional institutions; lack of social capital and trust between the 
masses, civil society, and the state; and the detrimental impact of a primarily oil- and 
mineral-based economic model. These factors all hinder the government’s willingness to 
work toward the best interest of the society as a whole. 
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The Ebola crisis and the kidnapping of girls and expanding persecution and 
murder of thousands by the terrorist group Boko Haram highlight the inability of the 
Nigerian state to deliver public goods such as security and health in an efficient manner. 
This is no surprise for Nigeria scholars, as poor governance and corruption have been 
characteristics of the Nigerian government since independence from Great Britain in 
1960. Torn by political upheaval, the country has experienced multiple iterations of failed 
autocratic military and civilian regimes, ethno-religious conflict, and the siphoning of 
public funds, consigning many Nigerians to a daily struggle for survival in terms of their 
personal safety and basic needs. Professor Said Adejumobi posits that Nigeria vacillates 
between stunted and eroding democratic governance, as evidenced by trends showing 
acute “executive arrogation of power and a culture of impunity, institutional erosion, and 
welfare deficit.”1 Across the board, good governance indicators such as horizontal and 
vertical accountability, transparency, rule of law, checks and balances, and active civil 
society are lacking.2 Although a successful election and transition to civilian rule in 1999 
was met with great hope and the promise of a new era of representative government, the 
state has yet to serve the population’s needs as expected in a democratic setting. In fact, 
increased violence suggests that the situation is getting worse. 
This thesis explores why the Nigerian state, through its democratic system, has 
not been able to meet reasonable expectations of good governance. While the country 
suffers from a “resource curse” that, according to some theorists, disconnects the state 
from its citizenry, its resources have not translated into the relative egalitarian 
distribution of wealth seen in Gulf states such as Kuwait.3 This failure to convert revenue 
1 Said Adejumobi, Governance and Politics in Post-Military Nigeria: Changes and Challenges (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 5. 
2 Wilfred L. David and Peggy A. David, “Resolving the African Development Cathexia: 
Empowerment of the People,” in State and Society in Africa: Perspectives on Continuity and Change, ed. 
Feraidoon Shams (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995), 18. 
3 Laura El-Katiri, Bassam Fattouh, and Paul Segal, “Anatomy of an Oil-Based Welfare State: Rent 
Distribution in Kuwait,” research paper, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance, and 
Globalisation in the Gulf States, London School of Economics and Political Science, Global Governance, 
January 2011, 1. www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/kuwait/documents/Fattouh.pdf. 
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into development is attributed to Nigeria’s comparative lack of management of resource 
income4 and further pushes the question of why the democratically elected government, 
which gains its legitimacy from representation, does not reflect public need. The 
deterioration of governance in Nigeria cannot be overstated. The annual failed-state index 
produced by the Fund for Peace in collaboration with Foreign Policy magazine generates 
a national-ranking score that is a compilation of 12 governance indicators ranging from 
human rights and rule of law to public-service distribution, security apparatuses, and 
economic decline. Grouped into three categories (economic, political, and social), the 
index depicts a steady decline in Nigeria’s rating—from 22 in 2006 to 14 in 2012.5 Why 
is the state failing to meet its legitimizing objective? Democratic theory argues that the 
state responds to civil society. Civil society, then, is the tool that shapes state behavior. 
Thus, the question is why Nigerian civil society has been limited in this context, unable 
to pressure the state into responding to public needs. 
This thesis studies the relationship between Nigerian civil society and the 
Nigerian state to determine why the civil society is unable to pressure the government 
into better representation. What are the missing relationships and linkages between these 
two entities that might promote institutional accountability and better representation? A 
number of theories are posited on the methods, tools, and elements required to engender 
good governance: parliamentary development, a free press, judicial autonomy, and an 
active civil society, to name a few. In reality, these component pieces of the solution 
ignore that Nigeria is missing some fundamental elements required to be in place for an 
effective civil society and state relationship. This thesis argues that the current civil 
society is unable to effectively reflect the needs of the citizenry or is insufficient in its 
ability to organize and make an impact on governance. Nigeria is a paradox when one 
considers the resources and potential at the country’s disposal, such as its wealth-
producing capacity, raw materials, human resources, and international position. The 
primary question of why this is the case drives this research. This thesis also provides a 
4 Ibid., 2.  
5 Failed States Index, Fund for Peace, http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cr-11-14-fs-
failedstatesindex2011-1106p.pdf; Failed States Index Trends Over Time, 
http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi12-trends. 
 2 
                                                 
comparative study of India, which has a similar legacy but has managed to achieve a 
more representative government due to pressures from a very vibrant civil society. 
A. THE MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Examining why Nigerian civil society has not succeeded in pressuring the state to 
respond to public need, this thesis looks at the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) 
in promoting institutional integrity and good governance. How effective have CSOs been 
at improving political accountability and weak institutions in Nigeria? Using India as a 
comparison, what lessons can be gleaned for improving CSO resiliency and 
effectiveness? Ultimately, transparency and accountability are foundational elements that, 
coupled with a rule of law meted out by an impartial justice system, improve governance 
and consolidate democracy within a country.6 What is hindering the ability of Nigerian 
CSOs to promote responsive governance? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Arguably, the greatest challenges for developing countries are endemic 
corruption, poor governance, and the debilitating effects that ripple through all aspects of 
existence when such detractors are in play. Economists and social scientists have 
wrestled with the causes, ramifications, and ameliorations of these problems for years. 
The ongoing tragedy of the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria and the growing 
death toll from Ebola in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
of which Nigeria is the lead nation, underscore the failure of governance in Nigeria.7 
Rampant corruption has rendered the government incapable of meeting the basic 
socioeconomic needs of more than half the population, creating an environment in which 
extremism flourishes. Reports of the Nigerian military and police forces’ botched 
attempts to protect affected citizens are widespread. An inability to locate and counter the 
predations of the terrorist group Boko Haram, which has caused over 6,000 fatalities 
6 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5. 
7 Blair Glencorse and Brooks Marmon, “The Cure for Ebola is Accountability: Africa’s Ebola 
Outbreak Isn’t Just a Healthcare Problem. It’s Also about a Crisis of Governance,” Foreign Policy, 
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/08/14/the_cure_for_ebola_is_accountability.  
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from 2009 to 2014 and kidnapped hundreds of girls,8 points to the ineptitude of the state 
in managing resources and providing basic security.9 As in the Ebola crisis, these 
problems further expose the inability of affected countries to respond in a cohesive 
manner for the entire region—due to lack of capacity and overreliance on foreign aid.10 
These recent examples highlight the catastrophic ramifications of high corruption and 
poor governance in ECOWAS countries—Nigeria specifically. 
The legitimacy of any democratic government generally stems from the 
participation of opposing sides in free and fair elections.11 Democratic governance is 
seen as an ideal that incorporates a regime, the public realm, and citizens into a 
relationship that conceptually balances all parts.12 However, according to democratic 
theory, democratization takes place over time and is fraught with problems. For 
developing nations, democratization is a double-edged sword. As Jack Snyder asserts, 
democratization without a foundation of “strong civic institutions” often leads to conflict 
as developing states “struggle to deal with the challenges of military security, economic 
growth, and popular participation in politics.”13 Nigeria embodies this dilemma. After 
four republics, the failure to establish strong institutions that function across ethnic 
divisions continues to threaten Nigeria’s stability. Meanwhile, the nationalism that fueled 
the push for independence has long since petered out. 
Furthermore, despite substantial income from commodity-based resources and the 
development potential often associated with access to such wealth, the country’s dismal 
poverty level is palpable. Instead of institutionalizing services, political actors have 
institutionalized a gross abuse of power, resulting in corruption that has bled the national 
8 “Terrorism in Nigeria: The Threat from Boko Haram and Ansaru,” (London: Henry Jackson Society, 
2014), 6, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Nigeria-Boko-Haram-Strategic-
Briefing.pdf.  
9 Ibid, 17–20. 
10Glencorse and Marmon, “Cure for Ebola.” 
11 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1971), 12. 
12 Phillippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is…and Is Not,” Journal of 
Democracy 2, no. 3 (Summer 1991):76. 
13 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: WW 
Norton, 2000), 266. 
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coffers and fostered a chronically unresponsive administrative system and a security and 
service morass that threaten the stability of the entire West African region. 
This thesis examines how the citizen, as a participant in civil society, can 
facilitate government responsiveness to the needs of the population. Is it possible, 
through education and training, to strengthen a society’s ability to demand transparency 
and accountability? What is the status of civil organizations in Nigeria, and what 
institutions are needed to improve the effectiveness of those civil organizations? 
Ancillary questions include: What role do citizens (the masses) and civil associations 
have in engendering change between election periods—that is, beyond periodically 
voting? Do citizens understand their role in the system? If not, why not? Understanding 
and fulfilling this role is central in the argument that civic participation somehow 
correlates to good governance.14 
The Western model of democracy has always been held as an ideal construct for 
democratic representation, especially the idea that the citizens are the fundamental rulers 
of a nation and have the power to mandate change. Phillippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn 
Karl state, “Citizens are the most distinctive element of democracies. All regimes have 
rulers and a public realm, but only to the extent that they are democracies do they have 
citizens.”15 In this thesis, civil society is understood to be the free association of citizens 
as they organize and police the officials they elected to execute public duties. If officials 
represent the people, then citizens should have certain responsibilities when these proxies 
fail to act in their best interests. As simple as that seems, countless examples spanning all 
forms of regimes illustrate the challenges citizens face in effecting improvements in 
governance from elected officials. 
An example of the challenges Nigeria faces is inadequate funding of the medical 
system. The humanitarian issues associated with a limited medical infrastructure and 
inadequate medical staff severely handicapped the regional response to Ebola. The 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) tracks and ranks 187 countries across 
14 Pierre Englebert, State Legitimacy and Development in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 
1. 
15 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is,” 77. 
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three basic factors of human development: “a long and healthy life, access to knowledge, 
and a decent standard of living.”16 Nigeria’s rank and human development index (HDI) 
has consistently fallen in the low development category. With a 2012 ranking of 153, 
Nigeria is comparable to Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which ranked 
173 and 186, respectively.17 The sustained mismanagement of funds is a direct cause of 
Nigeria’s high poverty levels, low life expectancies, and comparatively low rankings. 
These administrative challenges also reinforce ethnic and religious tensions, as 
manifested by the ineptness with which security problems like Boko Haram and the 
Niger Delta terrorists are handled.18 These insurgencies provide safe havens for the 
broader terrorist and Al Qaeda movements and inflict permanent instability in the region, 
which threatens development as the peoples’ focus on securing their basic personal safety 
precludes their ability to invest in progress and discourages foreign investment. 
C.  PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Nigeria’s confluence of problems frustrates its ability to fulfill administrative 
duties and provide effective services and national security. The weakness of current 
institutions; pervasive, economically devastating corruption; and the deadly terrorist 
attacks of Boko Haram throughout the country stem from entrenched issues. Three 
reasons for these problems are posited here. First, the traditional governing institutions 
that were directly connected to the people were systematically coopted by the state, 
creating a vacuum of linkages between the state and civil society that were not replaced. 
The precolonial traditional leadership roles ranging from policy shaping and service 
execution to justice and accountability have been marginalized by colonial and 
postcolonial national practices.19 The current manifestation of traditional institutions is 
16 UNDP, 2013 Human Development Report, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-
Profiles/NGA.pdf.  
17 Ibid. Table B, Nigeria’s 2012 HDI indicators relative to other countries. 
18 Janes HIS, “Nigerian Armed Forces: Security Assessment,” 
www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html. 
19 Daniel A. Tonwe and Osa Osemwota, “Traditional Rulers and Local Government in Nigeria: A 
Pathway to Resolving the Challenge,” Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance 13/14 (November 
2013): 131, http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/cjlg/article/viewFile/3728/3869. 
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weak and highly entrenched along ethnic lines, which is a reflection of a weak state. This 
poses a significant problem because it erodes the foundation of trust required to form 
inter- and intra-communal cooperation and to build a strong civil society that will be able 
to hold its officials accountable. 
Second, there is an endemic public trust deficiency across all institutions, 
including the military, which again has prevented the development of a civil-state 
relationship. This lack of trust came from factors such as decades of failed leadership and 
broken promises from civilian and military leaders, historically regionalized politics (pre- 
and post-independence), alienation of minority ethnic groups throughout each of four 
republics, and prolonged (predatory) military interventions that failed to correct the 
injustices of previous civilian administrations and further entrenched ethnic divisions, to 
name a few. These elements have led to a high level of suspicion within religious or 
ethnic groups and have frustrated the ability of civil society groups to work in a cohesive 
manner to advocate for change. 
Finally, the resource curse has further reinforced the disconnection between the 
state and its citizens and precludes the proper resourcing to develop a truly representative 
civil society and responsive state administration. Citizens feel completely disconnected 
from a political system that is wholly funded through oil and commodity income versus a 
tax-based system. Nigeria is a rentier state, and corruption has been systematically 
institutionalized by political actors over the course of four republics and 30 years of 
military rule. More than any other, the 1985–1993 regime of General Ibrahim Babangida 
is regarded as the period during which corruption permeated every aspect of life and 
destroyed the educational and intellectual base—the remaining bastion of opportunity for 
civic leadership.20 Under Babangida, the military was delegitimized as a potential tool 
for resolving or arbitrating issues in democratic governance.21 Additionally, aided by the 
internationally mandated structural adjustment programs (SAPs), 
20 Wale Adebanwi, Authority Stealing: Anti-Corruption War and Democratic Politics in Post-Military 
Nigeria (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2012), 34. 
21 Ibid., 11. 
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Babangida destroyed the nascent middle-class, decimated the cottage 
industries, ravaged three decades of careful intellectual husbandry, and 
had swollen the war-chests of a brigand military caste who today 
constitute a terrifying menace to fledgling democracy.22 
Nigeria’s economic model is harmful to all aspects of life in the country and is not 
conducive to developing civil society. Civil society requires an equitable tax-based 
system that fosters vertical and horizontal accountability. 
This study hypothesizes that the erosion of traditional institutions as a means of 
social accountability, the lack of public trust, and the rentier-state economic model are 
contributory factors to the inability of CSOs to effectively organize and pressure the 
Nigerian government to provide security and services for its citizens. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on civil society is extensive and generally falls into three broad 
functional categories: first, as an alternative to the state; second, as a supporter or ally to 
the state; and third, as a counterbalance to the state and its policies. The concept of civil 
society is uniquely Western in origin and, as a result, requires historical and contextual 
amplification when applied to postcolonial developing nations. Specifically, the unique 
circumstances surrounding India’s and Nigeria’s traditional societies before and during 
colonization, both countries’ quests for independence, and the characteristics of the 
period following independence provide context for discussing how CSOs may be used to 
foster democratic governance. 
1. Defining Civil Society 
The underlying issue of multiplicity in defining civil society was studied in its 
early European context by philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Charles de 
Montesquieu, and Alexis de Tocqueville in terms of civil society’s relationship to the 
state. Larry Diamond offers a resonant definition of civil society for this research and 
provides a list of attributes found in societies that conform to his definition. Diamond 
defines civil society as: 
22 Ibid., 34.  
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the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self-
supporting, autonomous from the State, and bound by the legal order or set 
of shared rules.. .. It involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere 
to express their interests, passions and ideas, exchange ideas, exchange 
information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the State, and hold 
State officials accountable. It is an intermediary entity, standing between 
the private sphere and the State.23 
He lists the characteristics of civil societies as follows: 
1. An organized civil society serves as a check against the excesses of 
government, human-rights violations, and abuse of the rule of law 
and monitors the application of constitutional provisions. 
2. It increases the participation and the skills of all the various 
segments of a society and instills a sense of tolerance, thrift, hard 
work, moderation, and compromise among the various competing 
parties in the society. 
3. It serves as an alternative to political parties and can offer a refuge 
for those who are shut out from their rights due to non-membership 
in given political parties. 
4. It serves to enhance the bargaining power of interest groups and 
provides inclusive mechanisms for them. 
5. It has a role in mitigating the excesses of fundamentalist extremists 
and maximalists who tend to have a very narrow view of life, in 
the context of either/or. It thus also provides other alternatives for 
negotiation within a multifaceted society.24 
By contrast, authors such as Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato define civil society 
in terms of different spheres of association. They make a point of delineating the need to 
keep political society and economic society as separate but correlated components with 
which civil society is juxtaposed.25 
 
23 Larry Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of 
Democracy 5, no. 3 (July 1994): 4–7. 
24 Ibid., 9–10. 
25 Ibid., x–xi. 
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a. Civil Society as an Alternative to the State (Irrespective of Regime) 
The historical origins of the concept of civil society stem from Western ideas of 
transforming the postcommunist society. In Civil Society: History and Possibilities, 
Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani present a compilation of studies that addresses the 
manner in which a postcommunist society interacts with the state—especially in terms of 
the development of autonomous institutions of “all spheres of social life... outside the 
jurisdiction of the State.”26 Besides the civil development of the postcommunist society, 
the compilation also explores the room for these new associational movements as a 
vehicle for “radical democratic aspirations.”27 
According to Kaviraj and Khilnani, contemporary discussions of civil society vis-
à-vis Third World societies would best correspond to the 19th-century early 
industrialization period in Western societies. On this assumption, Khilnani addresses the 
developmental context of civil societies, placing both geographic spaces on an equal 
footing rooted in the “reorganization of their societies around the power of the modern 
State”28 and defining associated developmental metrics and standards. In Africa in 
particular, the failure of many modern states to materialize has created a situation where 
some governments are unable to project influence, capability, or capacity beyond their 
immediate geographic (office) spaces. In this context, civil society is usually externally 
funded and primarily a service delivery agent. 
In Africa, civil-society entities tend to be backed by foreign aid and fill the void 
that inefficient states leave in meeting the basic needs of their citizenry and alleviating 
crippling poverty.29 In this role, CSOs literally fulfill the function of the state; hence, 
becoming an alternative for providing public good. According to Paulos Milkias, this 
observation goes hand in hand with the prevailing mission of most non-governmental 
26 Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani, Civil Society: History and Possibilities (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 6. 
29 Gayle Allard and Candace A. Martinez, The Influence of Government Policy and NGOs on 
Capturing Private Investment (OECD Global Forum on International Investment: 27–28 March 2008), 
www.oecd.org/investment/globalforum/40400836.pdf.  
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organizations (NGOs) to improve the stunted development-centric needs of people; e.g, 
health, education, and welfare.30 Gayle Allard and Candace Martinez refer to 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) statistics that 
support the argument that CSOs are a vehicle for service delivery: 
The funds that industrialized economies channeled through NGOs rose 
from 0.2% of their total bilateral official development aid (ODA) in 1970 
to 17% in 1996. In Africa, by 1994 already 12% of foreign ODA was 
being funneled to the region through NGOs, and the number has continued 
to rise. Transfers of official developed-country aid to NGOs in 2006 
totaled more than $2bn of total ODA, about 123% more than in 2002.31 
These NGOs and CSOs focused on humanitarian assistance and development have a rich 
history in Nigeria, which ranges from Canadian-sponsored sustainable agriculture 
promotion in specific states within Nigeria to Action Aid International that provides 
HIV/AIDS education and treatment. In most cases, these foreign aid sources have 
provided significant relief for the local populace but at the expense of retarding the 
Nigerian government’s willingness and urgency to develop similar capabilities to support 
its constituents.32 This is further detailed in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
b. Civil Society as a Component of the State 
A second perspective on the nature of civil society is based on the idea that civil 
society is a key sector in the governance equation—what some researchers consider the 
fifth pillar of open democracy. Similarly, Guillermo O’Donnell posits that a consolidated 
democracy has both horizontal and vertical accountability because it has gone through the 
institutional reforms that 
improve the representative functions of democratic governance by 
strengthening political parties and their linkages to social groups, reducing 
fragmentation in the party system, enhancing the autonomous capacity and 
30 Paulos Milkias, “The Role of Civil Society in Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in 
Ethiopia,” A paper presented at the Ethiopian American Council Conference hosting the Honorable Anna 
Gomes, European Union M.P. on the theme “Protecting the Democratic Rights of the Ethiopian People: 
Reflections and Next Steps,” held in Los Angeles, California, on July 2, 2006, 
http://ethiomedia.com/carepress/author_paulos.pdf. 
31 Allard and Martinez, Influence of Government Policy, 4.  
32 Ibid. 
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public accountability of legislatures and local governments, and 
invigorating civil society.33 
Steven Friedman argues that organized civil society is a tool for consolidating and 
strengthening democracy because it encourages the organization and participation of 
citizens, but he cautions against limiting that participation solely to CSOs. Friedman 
alludes to the pitfall of assuming that citizens can be represented through the civil-society 
paradigm only.34 
Acknowledging the benefits of civil society in helping educate and coalesce 
citizenship and nationalism, Daniel Hammett presents civil society as a Western concept 
that provides a viable tool for Africans. He asserts that organizing to promote citizen 
demands is not necessarily oppositional toward the state. He frames civil society as a 
multifaceted tool that can be molded to represent any heterogeneous society in working 
with the state or contesting political powers.35 In this paradigm, civil society can fall prey 
to cooptation by the state. But it can also be used to project the value of heterogeneity and 
nationalism and to knit together the diverse interests active in public life. Evidence of this 
type of CSO was common during transitions between military and civilian regimes 
during the turbulent years of the 1980s and 1990s. New civilian authorities often created 
unions, truth and commission agencies, antigraft commissions, and other agencies with 
the premise of creating space for civil-state dialogue, action, and development. In almost 
all cases, these agencies are eventually coopted into the patronage stream. This is further 
detailed in Chapter IV. 
 
33 Larry Diamond, et al., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives, 
(Baltimore:   Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), xviii. 
34 Steven Friedman, “Beneath the Surface: Civil Society and Democracy after Polokwane,” in  Testing 
Democracy: Which Way is South Africa Going? Edited by  Neeta Misra-Dexter and Judith February (Cape 
Town, South Africa: Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), 2010), 117–141. 
35 Daniel Hammett, “Civil Society and The Politics of Belonging in Southern Africa,” in The 
Handbook of Civil Society in Africa, ed. Ebenezer Obadare, (New York: Springer, 2014), 125–142, doi: 
10.1007/978–1-9614–8262–8_9. 
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c. Civil Society as a Counterbalance to the State 
Civil society can also serve as a pure critic of the state. It can function as an 
oppositional watchdog that slants toward presenting a counterpoint to state actions. While 
this third perspective occasionally has undertones of the previous perspective, it primarily 
centers on the capabilities and capacity of civil society within the modern authoritarian 
construct. In this context, Stephen Ndegwa is among those who argue that CSOs, 
including NGOs, are charged with opposing “undemocratic governments and furthering 
and consolidating democracy.”36 In this respect, the role of civil society is beyond filling 
the service void left by the state. Studies by Naomi Chazan, John Harbeson, Michael 
Bratton, and others promote this argument that the primary function of CSOs is to drive 
change.37 Writing mostly in the 1990s, these analysts look beyond the role of civil 
society during the immediate transitions from authoritarian rule. They contend that civil 
society is charged with not settling for half-formed democracies, but rather, with pushing 
to the farthest extent possible from a grassroots level to a mature, fully oppositional party 
system.38 
As previously mentioned, theorists such as Montesquieu advocated that civil 
society was necessary to counter tyrannical authoritarian dictums.39 As a counterpoint, 
writing in 2003, Howard Wiarda considers the prevalence of nondemocratic regimes in 
sub-Saharan Africa and how those regimes so “limit, co-opt, weaken, or destroy all civil-
society groups that they cannot themselves control.”40 He presents a fairly gloomy 
picture of civil society’s ability to make gains on behalf of citizens and argues that the 
form of civil society that emerges under authoritarian regimes is one of “corporatism” or 
state-owned civil society.41 
36 Stephen N. Ndegwa, The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in Africa (West Hartford, 
CT: Kumarian Press, 1996), 2. 
37 John Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds., Civil Society and the State in Africa 
(Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 5. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 26. 
40 Howard J. Wiarda, Civil Society: The American Model and Third World Development (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 2003, 47. 
41 Ibid. 
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Rejecting Wiadra’s pessimism, Marie Perinova offers a more hopeful assessment 
of the prospects of civil society in authoritarian regimes by conducting an analysis of 
China, Burma, and Vietnam.42 Perinova states that civil society can exist beyond a 
corporatist role in an authoritarian setting. The countries she studies operate in a space 
that allows the governments to “preserve the regime” and simultaneously allows 
“associations [to] use the available space to defend their self-defined interests and 
achieve their goals.”43 This unique balance of authoritarian and democratic features 
ultimately serves the important role of representing the people’s interests. Optimistic as 
Perinova’s analysis is, the underlying caveat is that all three countries examined are 
market-based open economies. The economic goals of each regime are ultimately the 
driving factor behind the gradual liberalization that civil society is able to achieve. 
Once again, Nigeria’s tendency to oscillate between civilian and military regimes 
during the 1980s and 1990s also provides examples of these types of CSOs. In cases 
where unions or media criticized civilian administrations or mobilized through strikes 
and walkouts, the administration tended to disestablish unions, federalize media outlets, 
and even arrest lead organizers. Chapters II and III provide further evidence of this type 
of CSO activity. 
2. The Disconnect between the Citizen (the Masses), Civil Society, and 
the State in Nigeria 
As posited earlier, civil society is frustrated in its ability to galvanize the citizenry 
and promote responsive government actions for three main reasons. First, traditional 
institutions have been destroyed or coopted; second, \ trust is lacking between ethnic and 
religious divisions; and third, the economic model is corrupt. All three elements are 
critical to civil society development. 
42 Marie Perinova, “Civil Society in Authoritarian Regime: The Analysis of China, Burma and 




                                                 
a. Traditional Institutions Destroyed 
Margaret Peil describes traditional norms of precolonial Nigerian societies where 
“greetings” or gifts are associated with paying homage and providing a token when 
seeking a favor from an elder or chief.44 This system was a foundational aspect of the 
hierarchical chain of command around which societal life and personal accountability 
was built. It formed the basis of the community structure. The chief or council of elders 
represented the structure for order and discipline—meting out justice, arbitrating, and 
ensuring security and care of the community. In A History of Nigeria, Toyin Falola and 
Matthew Heaton detail the erosion of these traditional institutions in Nigeria, which 
started with the British occupation.45 The period of “indirect rule” started in earnest soon 
after amalgamation in 1914. As a concept, the British chose this method based on the 
premise of maintaining the continuity of traditional societies and promoting stability as 
they embarked on a process of “political, economic, and social transformation in 
Nigeria.”46 In reality, this period of indirect rule is marked by the systemic alienation of 
“traditional authorities from their subject populations through their associations with the 
colonial regime.”47 
Both writers detail how the indigenous rulers who did not implement British 
colonial mandates were “ousted” and replaced with “more malleable replacements” 
between 1914 and 1929.48 Further complicating this issue was the variance in application 
of British indirect rule in the Muslim caliphates in the north and the Ibo in the east, (these 
areas saw very limited British involvement), compared to the Yoruba land in the 
southwest (which had a significantly higher British involvement). This variance affected 
local awareness of regionalized politics and support for or opposition to independence. 
44 Margaret Peil, Nigerian Politics: The People’s View (London: Cassell, 1976), 53. 
45 Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, A History of Nigeria (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 112.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 110. 
48 Ibid., 111. 
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The variance is also still evident in contemporary disputes for autonomy and the uneven 
administration that exists within the geographical boundaries.49 
Where existing institutions survived colonialism, and in cases where citizens 
relied on local councils for problem resolution or as a conduit for resources and other 
administrative solutions, the First Republic destroyed that connection. The persistent 
political interference of deposing or investigating local community councils ultimately 
broke the trust citizens had in those institutions.50 Today, most traditional authorities are 
ceremonial in nature and often appointed by contemporary politicians who then use the 
connection to validate their legitimacy as members of a particular ethnic group—
primarily for mobilizing electoral votes. Being coopted by the administration renders 
these traditional institutions ineffective as a source for civic mobilization to challenge the 
establishment. 
b. Public Trust Deficiency 
Trust deficit spans historically regionalized politics (pre- and post-independence), 
alienation of minority ethnic groups throughout each of four republics, and prolonged and 
predatory military interventions that failed to correct the injustices of previous civilian 
administrations and further entrenched ethnic divisions. 
Peil lays out the context whereby “elites” that were in favor with the British 
administration in the 1940s and 1950s ultimately created an ethnic awareness and used it 
as a divisive tool that would reverberate throughout Nigerian history. She states, 
Politicians seeking mass support found that only platforms based on local 
interests aroused any enthusiasm....in the first introduction of politics to 
the citizen, the medium itself dictated the style. Action Group leaders were 
also quick to find that they could best get Yoruba backing by focusing on 
anti-Ibo images. If the people were not concerned with domination by 
stranger, the politicians taught them that they should be.51 
49 Ibid., 116–118. 
50 Peil, Nigerian Politics, 140.  
51 Ibid., 74. 
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Political manipulation was critical to determine who would rule at independence, and by 
1962 “it was clear that distribution of governmental power and resources (especially seats 
in parliament) was tied to population, and therefore informal means must be used to 
manipulate this bureaucratic imposition (as towns needed to be large enough to qualify 
for amenities).52 Regional power directly translated to federal power and was emphasized 
in the Constitution of the 1950s.53 As a result, there was never any concerted effort to 
develop interregional associations. 
The alienation felt by minority ethnic groups within the larger regional 
geographic areas caused even more complications, which eroded any semblance of unity 
and trust at the founding of the new nation and continue in the current political arena.54 
Regional fissures permeated the politics of the First Republic and tensions fed doubt as 
politicians took questionable actions to depict regional population growth—an effort to 
gain larger cuts of federal revenue-sharing profits. The census reports conducted in 1953 
and 1963 were essentially a power struggle between the northern and the other regions 
and further eroded the trust of individual Nigerians in the new government’s political 
structure. Falola states, “The census crisis indicated to many Nigerians the extent to 
which governments in all regions were willing to lie and cheat in the pursuance of 
political power.”55 That pursuit of power over people led to high levels of distrust that 
channeled down to the 1967 civil war and ushered in the military intervention. 
The Nigerian military quickly proved to be another conduit of mistrust within 
society. Of the Nigerian military, Crawford Young discusses how the colonial practice of 
heavy recruitment from easy-to-control “hinterland communities such as the Tiv,”56 
based on the British divide-and-conquer tactics, would unfold in the 1966 military coups 
and subsequent Biafra civil war. While the military was heavily credited with salvaging a 
tenuous situation in its supervision of the post-Biafra reconciliation process, the young 
52 Ibid., 97. 
53 Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 158. 
54 Ibid., 159. 
55 Ibid, 168. 
56 Crawford Young, The Postcolonial State in Africa (Madison, WI: Wisconsin University Press, 
2012), 149. 
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military officers who made names for themselves during that period would later rise to 
the ranks of general officers, lead coups to take over the Nigerian state, and siphon off 
untold billions—all the while betraying the trust of the citizens. Young mentions 
Olusegun Obasanjo, Ibrahim Babangida, Yakubu Danjuma, and Shehu Yar’Adua as 
examples of contemporary military figures in the Nigerian political arena.57 General Sani 
Abacha is an example of someone who spans both the trust deficit and the failed 
economic model. Over the period of a five-year dictatorship, he stole over $4 billion in 
public funds after justifying his rise to power as an effort to root out the “incompetence, 
nepotism, atrocities,” and other sins of his predecessors.58 
Finally, Lanre Odeyemi also explains how the fear of religious domination by one 
group over the other continues to stoke the fire of mistrust by acts such as the 
introduction of the Shari’a legal system, which Christians in particular see as a violation 
of section 10 of the 1979 and 1999 constitutions.59 He discusses the impact of divide-
and-rule politics where a state loses its legitimacy when it caters to only one group of 
people, leaving other groups to find means of survival and solidarity. That search for 
survival and solidarity erodes any sense of national integration. From its use by British 
colonialists as a form of pacification, to the move under Babangida that enjoined the 
country to the Organization of Islamic Conference in 1986 to the present time, political 
elites have used religious domination as a divisive tool.60 
c. Failed Economic Model/Policies 
Falola and Heaton discuss the precursor to the existing rentier state: a British 
economic model based on import-export markets of cash crops and minerals. The local 
economies that were centered on agriculture and capital accumulation were replaced with 
an extractive economic model where raw materials were exported and finished goods 
57 Ibid., 149–150. 
58 Ibid., 47. 
59 Lanre Olu-Adeyemi, “Ethno-Religious Conflicts and the Travails of National Integration in 
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic,” Department of Political Science and Public Administration, February 15, 2006, 
3. www.academia.edu/1847639/Ethno-
Religious_Conflicts_And_The_Travails_of_National_Integration_In_Nigerias_Fourth_Republic_2006 
60 Ibid., 7. 
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imported back. Where traditional economic systems were community focused, the British 
model “redirects economic activity toward external markets and thereby makes the 
colonial endeavor self-sustaining for the colonial government and profitable for British 
and European business.”61 This extractive economic model shapes the current rentier 
state in Nigeria. 
One of the primary drawbacks of a rentier state is the concentration of power into 
the hands of a limited few, which leads to the indoctrination of cronyism and “personal 
loyalty in return for material reward.”62 The overreliance on commodities such as oil and 
gas left Nigeria in financial ruin after the 1970s’ oil collapse. With the withdrawal of 
Soviet funds, the World Banks SAPs became the only source of funds, and they were 
direly needed to prop up the country in the 1980s. A neoliberal ideology, SAPs were 
billed as a tool to reduce rampant inflation and stabilize the sub-Saharan countries’ 
economies that were in a free fall.63 Most of these countries, Nigeria included, were 
under dictatorship during this time. The most significant adverse effect of SAPs on the 
country was the new breed of oligarchs who benefited from the dissolution of state assets. 
Cronyism permeated every aspect of the economy that was not bankrupted by 
privatization. Elaborate schemes are illustrated by the development of the Ajaokuta Steel 
Mill, which alone would see more than $10 billion siphoned from government funds over 
a 30-year period—”without a single ingot ever emerging.”64 By the end of the Babangida 
regime, the implementation of SAPs had completely devalued living standards across 
Nigeria.65 The new and more efficient “adjusted” economy that the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected has yet to emerge. 
Like Young, Falola and Heaton also discuss the SAP, but go further in examining 
the overreliance on oil revenues in the 1990s when Abacha expedited the divestment of 
Nigerian foreign holdings, implemented a practice of printing excessive amounts of 
61 Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 111. 
62 Young, Postcolonial State, 175. 
63 Ibid., 174–176 
64 Ibid., 183. 
65 Larry Diamond et al., Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under 
Babangida (London: Lynne Rienner 1997), 385. 
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currency—which caused high inflation, and even destroyed a significant number of oil 
refineries. All these machinations were glossed over because high oil prices at the time 
equated to high oil revenues.66 
Nigeria represents an example of the convergence of the worst-case scenarios of 
the economic and development theories of Karl Marx, Adam Smith, and Karl Polanyi. 
Despite years of abject inequality with the means of production concentrated in the hands 
of an elite few, a revolt (per Marxist predictions) has yet to materialize to overthrow the 
pseudo-capitalist system. But Nigerians are also not experiencing the trickle-down 
benefits that Smith foretells of an essentially laissez-faire regulatory market system. Any 
economic surplus is quickly redistributed within the elite, with no benefit to the 
population. 
As presented above, erosion of traditional institutions, lack of trust between ethnic 
and religious groups, sustained corrupt military practices, and a failed economic model 
have all hindered the ability of a sustainable cohesive civil society to take root in Nigeria. 
In turn, civil society has been ineffective at advocating for services and security on behalf 
of Nigerian citizens. 
3. Benchmark Case: India 
Unlike Nigeria, India has had more success at mobilizing a sustained and 
inclusionary civil society,67 and there is an extensive amount of literature on the country 
and its civil society. One of the most important and relevant to the comparison with 
Nigeria is that of social scientists, such as Partha Chatterjee and Ashutosh Varshney, who 
offer compelling evidence that current Indian civil society is strong because of the 
traditional governments that were nurtured by Nehru and Gandhi.68 Additionally, 
Varshney provides a case study of six Hindu and Muslim cities to emphasize the critical 
66 Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 233. 
67 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 290. 
68 Partha Chatterjee, “Post-colonial Civil and Political Society,” in Civil Society: History and 
Possibilities, eds. Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 167; 
Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond,” World Politics 58, no. 3 
(2001), 362-398. 
 20 
                                                 
necessity for intra-ethnic associations that have been nurtured in various parts of India 
since independence. The achievement of those associations’ mitigating conflict and 
representing the needs of the constituents more successfully than other regions without a 
similar history further strengthens the argument. 
However, not all evidence supports the strength of Indian civil society. 
Specifically, Indian political scientist Deepika Gupta finds fault with the structure of the 
Panchayat Raj system, which is a constitutionally ratified method to incorporate civil 
participation into the central government’s growth and development plan.69 The reader is 
left to make a final determination because in detailing the problems of the established 
structure, Gupta spends most of the article addressing a parallel system that inadvertently 
developed. Also addressing the panchayat, D. Bandyopadhyay, Saila K. Ghosh, and 
Buddhadeb Ghosh present a cautionary but hopeful joint analysis of the system—if it 
remains autonomous and does not get coopted by elites or the government.70 
One of the primary reasons for Indian success lies in the historical trajectory of 
British rule in India. Stronger democratic institutions were in place during the transition 
to independence, and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s post-independence 
administration strove to be inclusive and representative of the diversity in the new 
independent nation. Snyder posits that building a strong civil society requires an 
architecture built on functioning institutions before political participation can spread 
throughout society. India had this architecture. Unlike Nigeria, official British rule in 
India spanned a full century, during which time the British laid an infrastructure of 
representative institutions, built state administrative capacity, educated the elite, 
established English as the official language, and professionalized the legal system and 
press.71 The lasting impact of these early acts still resonates in the democratic experience 
in India. 
69 Deepika Gupta, “Reinvigorating Panchayat Raj System in Madhya Pradesh,” The India Journal of 
Political Science 67, no.1 (2006): 97. 
70 D. Bandyopadhyay, Saila K. Ghosh, and Buddhadeb Ghosh, “Dependency versus Autonomy: 
Identity Crisis of India’s Panchayats,” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no.38 (2003), 3985. 
71 Ibid. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this thesis, Nigeria is used as a single case study to conduct an analysis of civil 
society from the country’s predemocratic through its democratic periods. The objective is 
to gain a better understanding of the components that define civil society and its role in 
vertical accountability in Nigeria. A key aspect of this research is exploring the 
relationships and levels of structure and agency that constrain the citizens in their 
interaction with the legislative, judicial, and executive institutions of government. The 
sources identified in the literature review as well as other reference materials and articles 
that apply to various aspects of the research is employed. India is used as a benchmark 
for empowered, participatory governance because of comparable factors such as being a 
former British colony and because both India and Nigeria possess diverse ethnic and 
religious factions. Due to time limitations and limiting the scope of this thesis, the 
research on India is not extensive. For Nigeria and India, primary sources include 
governmental and other official documents. 
Secondary sources, such as books, journals, publications, relevant media, and 
expert analysis, enhance the research. Reliance is placed on generally accepted measures 
of accountability in governance as collected and depicted by Afrobarometer, 
Transparency International (TI), and Human Rights Watch, as well as World Bank data 
on aid effectiveness in reducing poverty and inequality and improving education, health, 
and other measures of human welfare.72 The data these research organizations have 
compiled provide concrete metrics of government commitment and records of the 
distribution and use of communal resources. A balanced literature of Western and 
African experts is presented. 
Finally, articles from newspapers, periodicals, network news, press coverage, 
blogs, and other websites on current perspectives concerning the provision of services 
and security in Nigeria and India are drawn upon. 
72 World Bank Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator#topic-2. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis contains five chapters. Chapter I provides a historical overview of the 
Nigerian political environment since independence. It also covers the security and service 
challenges of traditional forms of institutions that existed just prior to independence 
compared to what exists in contemporary Nigeria. It also encompasses the larger concept 
of civil society—its limitations and potential. Additionally, the chapter contains a 
literature review and the methodology used. 
Chapter II discusses the civil society disconnect within the context of the erosion 
of traditional institutions and the negative impact that erosion has on cohesively 
mobilizing contemporary civil society. It also examines the role of the citizen and vertical 
accountability as a check and balance to the state. 
Chapter III analyzes the trust deficiency that exists throughout the Nigerian social, 
political, and economic landscape and the effect of that on civil society mobilization. It 
also takes an extensive look at corruption at all levels of government, using a local 
government level of Rivers State to illustrate the link between corruption and distrust. 
Chapter IV looks at the effects of a broken economic model that is overly reliant 
on oil. It also delves into the Afrobarometer and other relevant surveys that provide the 
citizens’ perspectives on government performance. The chapter looks at poverty and 
inequality trends and the effects of these trends on the citizens and on civil society. 
Chapter V examines how India’s approach to incorporating traditional 
institutions, its economic model, and the concerted effort to build intercommunal 
associations set a different trajectory for contemporary civil society vis-à-vis Nigeria. It 
then synthesizes this research and presents conclusions and recommendations. 
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II. THE CITIZEN AND TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Chapter II covers the larger concept of civil society, and specifically civil society 
in the postcolonial developing nation of Nigeria—its history, successes, and limitations. 
The primary focus is on the erosion of traditional institutions and the negative influence 
that erosion has on mobilizing contemporary civil society to have an impact on the state. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of NGOs or CSOs is predicated on the idea that citizens are the core 
element of the organization. However, across the globe, the administrative structure of 
these organizations is primarily an elite-driven cadre that are able to organize around a set 
of interests such as human rights, women’s rights, education, and budget transparency. 
According to democratic theory, these varied interests lead to a proliferation of different 
interest-based CSOs. The ensuing competition among the CSOs should lead to mass 
mobilization and some form of government response. In Nigeria, NGOs and CSOs are 
numerous, yet limited mass mobilization around interests means the state does not 
respond to the masses or the elites that run the organizations. The reasons for this are 
varied and problematic as articulated in the research published in 2006 by Professor 
Obiora Chinedu Okafor.73 The study looks at the composition, structure, and geopolitical 
locations of the range of NGO/CSO categories that exist in Nigeria—civil/political rights 
NGOs, social/economic rights NGOs, gender-focused NGOs, and 
minority/environmental rights NGOs—and conclusions are extrapolated across the 
general NGO/CSO population in Nigeria.74 For example, most Nigerian CSOs are urban 
based (in Lagos or Abuja). Yet because most of the Nigerian population is rural, the 
ability to gain legitimacy at the grassroots level is limited.75 Another issue is the 
personalistic nature of most CSO/NGO administrations—most are externally funded and 
locally “managed” as opposed to funding through membership which would potentially 
73 O.C. Okafor, Legitimizing Human Rights NGOs: Lessons from Nigeria (Trenton, NJ: Africa World 
Press, 2006), 54. 
74 Okafor, Legitimizing, 54–69.  
75 Ibid., 55. 
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broaden the influence and legitimacy of the organization with the grassroots population. 
As a result, Okafor concludes that 
virtually all of these NGOs are, in practice, controlled (with few effective 
internal checks) by a powerful founder/CEO, who is the oga (or 
undisputed boss) of his/her organization. Without a powerful membership, 
such founder/CEOs usually reign over their organizations largely 
unconstrained by the local community. Having thus largely excluded from 
their real ranks the very population of average Nigerians whose interests 
they want to advance.76 
Okafor further concludes that the primary driver for the personalistic default is to 
maintain control of the associated funding flow. Other factors that seem to dilute the 
effectiveness of the entire NGO/CSO community include the urban bias of most CSOs, 
which leads to significant neglect of rural areas, and the proliferation of NGOs leading up 
to and since the 1999 democratic rule, which has proved somewhat detrimental in that the 
growth of NGOs (many of which are very transient because they lack structure and 
objectives and therefore fail within a short timeframe). Ultimately, Okafor concludes that 
the (mainly intentional) “exclusion of the vast majority of Nigerians [rural and urban] 
from participation in the structure and governance of these NGOs helps explain the 
limited nature of success that these groups have had in engendering the transformation” 
and grassroots mobilization that would engage the state.77 
In December 2014, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) 
published an assessment of NGO/CSO guidelines in Nigeria. Of note, the 1999 and 2010 
modifications to the Nigerian Constitution continue to guarantee the freedom to freely 
form associations that serve in a watchdog capacity for state policies.78 The ICNL 
assessment discusses the 2014 federal initiative to create a series of pending CSO/NGO 
legislative actions primarily focused on regulating the acceptance and utilization of 
financial contributions from donor agencies. Nigerian NGOs/CSOs are primarily 
externally funded, meaning the proposed bill has the potential to curtail CSO/NGO 
76 Ibid., 69. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Section 40 of 1999 Constitution of the Government of Nigeria as referenced in the International 
Center for Not-for-profit Law), www.icnl.org/research/monitor/nigeria.html. 
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functionality in Nigeria. The proposed bill also introduces the first attempt by the federal 
government to engage with and fund CSO efforts in Nigeria. The ICNL describes the bill 
as follows: 
The creation of a “Civil Society Regulatory Commission (CSRC),” which 
would be “peopled by civil society activists and. .. free from undue State’s 
interference that will regulate the conduct and activities of civil society 
organizations in Nigeria,” with the following functions: 
1. Registering CSOs in Nigeria; 
2. Sanctioning CSOs that abuse the ethics or rules of the Commission; and 
3. Proposing that grants be made available by the National Assembly to 
CSOs. 
The Conference report proposed that “statutory funds to be known as 
“Civil Society Grants/Fund” be annually appropriated by the National 
Assembly for civil society activities, in order to strengthen the ability of 
CSOs to perform their watchdog roles, act as checks against impunity by 
State actors, and to enthrone an open, just and accountable society. The 
Fund/Grant shall be managed by the CSRC.79 
The proposed bill is expected to be voted on after the 2015 elections. As ICNL 
posits, the closed nature of the Nigerian federal government means that, if implemented, 
the bill poses a threat to the freedoms that most CSOs currently experience. 
The current situation is precarious. If the federal government does set up the 
CSRC, then the state is showing some steps of validating that CSOs are a vital 
component of the democratic process—and that they represent the people. On the other 
hand, the limits that ICNL warn about in its assessment suggest that if these new laws are 
passed as they are currently written, the federal government will impose restrictions that 
could further hamper CSO activities. CSOs could also face pressure to conform to the 
states mandates, essentially turning most of them into patronage vehicles or government 




                                                 
B. HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS 
Civil society has experienced two specific periods of significance in Nigerian 
history. The first was during the independence drive in the 1950s when the elites 
organized against the colonial state. Once independence was achieved, the civil society 
associations began to collapse because independence was the initial goal, and, once 
achieved, they seemingly had no cohesive holistic plan with regard to the development of 
a sustainable postcolonial inclusive government. This exposed a critical limitation that 
CSOs in Nigeria are still unable to overcome. Instead, the devolution of disparate efforts 
occurred along ethnic or regional lines as elites fought for control of state power and 
resources. The ensuing conflict culminated in the 1967–1970 Nigeria-Biafra Civil War 
and the subsequent 30-year military rule. 
Nigeria experienced a proliferation of CSOs in the push to end military rule. 
These CSOs ranged from professional and nonprofessional associations such as the 
National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS); the Nigerian Bar Association 
(NBA); the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO); the Nigerian Medical Association 
(NMA); the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR); and Women in 
Nigeria (WIN).80 While elites mobilized to end military rule, the failure to plan beyond 
the transition to civilian rule handicapped their effectiveness. The lack of a cohesive 
agenda for the postmilitary consolidation created a void that was initially filled by 
government-sponsored oppositional CSOs—causing confusion among the Nigerian 
masses and a level of disorganization that still exists among contemporary CSOs. The 
question that then rises is why is this the case? What continues to disconnect civil society 
in Nigeria from the state? The answer lies in multiple issues. This chapter looks at the 
historical legacy of the colonial period and the early independence phase, which 
effectively undermined the tribal structures that initially formed the basis of traditional 
civil society, and then it examines the possible reasons the new civil society has remained 
disconnected to the state. 
80 Diamond et al., Transition without End, 380. 
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C. CIVIL SOCIETY DISCONNECT 
The first evidence of disconnect from the state was during the transition agenda 
laid out by General Ibrahim Babangida. In 1989, the National Electorate Commission 
(NEC)—a state agency—issued highly restrictive guidelines for political parties that were 
forming in preparation for the democratic transition. On 7 October 1989, Babangida 
negated all elite efforts by unilaterally denying political party rights to 13 potential 
associations.81 Instead, he and the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) created two 
new parties: the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention 
(NRC).82 The move was condemned by all CSOs as it imposed a top-down political party 
organization on citizens and associations, in essence “ordering and manipulating actors at 
will.”83 
Another example of the disconnect is evidenced by the states’ concerted effort to 
create its own state-sponsored CSOs in response to the backlash from the international 
and citizen-driven CSOs, who protested the cancellation of the 1993 presidential election. 
In spite of Babangida’s and the AFRC’s attempts to stifle CSO efforts to push for civilian 
rule, M. K. O. Abiola won what to date is still considered to have been “the fairest, freest, 
and most peaceful election in Nigerian history.”84 Despite international efforts that 
entailed Britain and remaining European communities suspending aid to Nigeria,85 
Babangida refuses to recognize the election results and instead turns over authority to an 
Interim National Government (ING), which is taken over in short order by another 
military officer—General Sani Abacha.86 These series of events underscored a theme that 
still resonates in Nigeria today: the state, and whoever is in charge, is not beholden to 
elites or citizens. 
81 Ibid., 179. 
82 Ibid., 183–184. 
83 Ibid., 183. 
84 Ibid., 259. 
85 Ibid., 491. 
86 Ibid., 491–492. 
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Under the Abacha regime, the government embarked on a cooptation agenda that 
led to divisions within the CSO community. First, the state created or sponsored a 
number of GONGOs/CSOs, such as the Media Democratic Forum (MDF), the Youth 
Earnestly Asking for Abacha (YEAA), the National Association of Patriotic 
Professionals (NAPP), and many more, in an effort to counter the democratization efforts 
of the community based CSOs.87 Second, the Abacha government encouraged and took 
measures to reinforce cleavages that existed along ethnic and regional lines. E. Remi 
Aiyede posits that allowing the northern region to remain fairly closed left the impression 
that democracy was only a southern agenda.88 
The 2007 presidential election was more proof to CSOs that the state could take 
any action without consequences and with even less regard for their input or objections. 
After failing to buy a third term in office, President Obasanjo embarked upon an 
elaborate plan to maintain political influence by rigging the entire election process. 
Despite the objections of domestic CSOs, the president pressured the Independent 
National Electoral Commission (INEC) to disqualify his two main rival candidates. The 
INEC then proceeded to use questionable citizen registration tactics that domestic 
organizations such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI) strenuously objected to—
only to be ignored. The subsequent voting process, which domestic and international 
observer groups noted as having anywhere from a 5-to 14-million turnout, was 
disregarded as the INEC announced a victory for Yar’Adua (who was handpicked by 
President Obasanjo) by 24 million votes.89 Despite domestic and international CSOs’ 
condemnation of the entire process, to include the NDI observer led by former U.S. 
secretary of state Madeline Albright, the ECOWAS Observer Mission and others, the 
results were certified by the INEC.90 Perhaps more than any other, this incident 
highlighted the disconnect between CSOs and the state. Ultimately, international leaders 
87 E. Remi Aiyede, “The Dynamics of Civil Society and Democratization Process in Nigeria,” 
Canadian Journal of African Studies 37, no.1 (2003): 9. 
88 Ibid., 10. 
89 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), 
107. 
90 Ibid., 109. 
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such as the United Sates accepted the new president-elect, and the Nigerian citizens 
accepted the results without any civil disturbance, leading former U.S. ambassador to 
Nigeria John Campbell to conclude that 
for most Nigerians a stolen election was not worth a riot, a police beating, 
and jail. Their reaction was evidence of their divorce from their formal 
institutions of government. In the public’s perception, the Nigerian 
government was now as “colonial,” irrelevant, and exploitative as the 
British regime had ever been. Their defense was to have as little to do with 
the government or the state as possible, to migrate internally into the 
worlds of family, ethnic group, and religion.91 
The culmination of these series of events proved to CSOs that any gains they would get 
would only occur if the state were willing. It also proved to the citizenry that the CSO 
structure could not compel the state to act in a fair and representative manner. 
D. ELITE DISCONNECT FROM THE MASSES 
In the modern postmilitary democracy that exists in Nigeria, the widening gap 
between the elite and the average citizen is extensive. Specifically, since the Babangida 
and Abacha eras, power and access to power has equated to comfortable living that is 
increasingly outside the scope of most Nigerians. For CSOs, previously stated history of 
cooptation and patronage has also led to many CSO leaders’ benefiting as members of the 
elite—further alienating them from the average citizen. In 2013, the CIVICUS World 
Alliance for Citizen Participation sponsored a study to assess six West African states—
including Nigeria. The findings show that CSOs face a number of challenges including 
funding related issues, resource deficiencies (human resources and physical equipment), 
donor relations difficulties, unsound internal management practices, internal regulations, 
limited collaboration with other CSOs, and a disconnect with the society they serve, 
which is reflected in the low impact on the local communities and on policies of the 
state.92 Why has this happened and what are some of the reasons for the disconnect 
between the grassroots population and the state? As stated in the hypothesis, various 
91 Ibid., 111. 
92 Andrew Firmin and Patricia Deniz, “CIVICUS Civil Society Index Rapid Assessment: West Africa 
Regional Report,” March 2014, www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_Nigeria_Country_Report.pdf 
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factors over a period of time have contributed to the weakening of communication 
between the state and society in Nigeria today. Some of those are discussed in the 
previous sections. Another dimension deals with the disconnect between the citizens and 
civil society that positioned itself as the citizens’ advocate. As the primary advocates, the 
tribal system became weaker with the formation of the central government in the 
postcolonial period and in subsequent administrations.. 
1. The Nigerian Citizen and Vertical Accountability 
In the larger topic of democracy, of which civil society is a component, 
citizenship also warrants a discussion. Essentially, the citizen is the one who is 
disenfranchised in Nigeria; therefore, the citizen has a role to play in reversing that trend. 
Any civil society attempt to mediate between the state and the citizen will have a greater 
impact if individuals are as invested as the CSOs that aim to represent their interests to 
the government. As Uwem Essia and Afzal Yearoo state, “It is now broadly accepted that 
democracy should extend beyond conducting free elections. Open and democratic 
societies require an informed citizenry, public participation and governing processes that 
are transparent and realistic.”93 Stated differently, a democracy is the space where the 
state, the public realm, and citizens compete, cooperate, or reach consensus on policies 
that are representative of the interests and values of those governed. That competition 
requires access for individuals and parties and a fair means to hold any elected official 
accountable for his or her actions.94 All this amounts to vertical accountability, which is 
an essential component of democracy. 
Writing on the essential need for civil society or “intermediate groups” to foster a 
sense of solidarity and provide a space for citizens to shape norms and values, social 
scientist Thomas Janoski quotes Peter Ekeh: “Short-term exchanges with expectations of 
benefit for every cost tend to destroy solidarity, while long-term exchanges benefiting a 
93 Uwem Essia and Afzal Yearoo, “Strengthening Civil Society Organizations/Government 
Partnerships in Nigeria,” International NGO Journal 4, no. 9, (Sept 2009): 370, 
www.academicjournals.org/article/article1381501695_Essia%20and%20Yearoo.pdf   
94 Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is,” 103-105. 
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large segment of the population increase it.”95 Of significant importance in Ekeh’s 
statement is that without those intermediate groups or civil society, the likelihood of 
developing those long-term mass-population exchanges and benefits is unlikely. The 
short-term and elite-focused nature of benefits in Nigerian society suggests weak citizen 
solidarity. 
In a related theme, Michael Bratton and Carolyn Logan’s comparative assessment 
of public attitudes in 18 African countries support the argument that while most 
Nigerians want democracy and do vote, they do not yet embrace or know the full 
responsibility of citizenship as it relates to its role in securing democracy.96 They posit 
that constituents of the study have adopted a delegative vice a representative expectation 
of their elected officials—engaging in electoral politics, then essentially ceding their 
rights to unilateral rule or existing institutions of horizontal accountability.97 For 
example, Figure 1 shows the 2005–2006 survey results of those who believe that “voters” 
have the responsibility of holding parliament accountable for its actions. 
95 Thomas Janoski, Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, 
Traditional, and Social Democratic Regimes (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 24. 
96 Michael Bratton and Carolyn Logan, “Voters But Not Yet Citizens: The Weak Demand for Political 
Accountability in Africa’s Unclaimed Democracies,” Afrobarometer, Working Paper No 63 (September 
2005): 1. 
97 Ibid., 3–6. 
 33 
                                                 
 Figure 1.  Popular demand for vertical accountability in Nigeria98 
A 2013 follow-up publication edited by Bratton revealed no significant change in results 
and perception of citizens and vertical accountability.99 
2. The Masses, the Elite, and Civil Society in Nigeria 
Writing about civil society and democratization in Nigeria, Aiyede cites the 
characteristics of the various regimes over time, many of which entailed suspension of 
constitutions and varying degrees of personal rule that “involved the denial of the 
peoples’ rights to participate in the decision-making process.”100 He posits that civil 
society efforts initially provided hope for reclaiming the citizens’ role and place in 
governance, but perhaps with too high expectations. While civil society has opened up 
democracy in Nigeria, it has been less effective at sustaining or consolidating those 
representative ideals. 
98 Bratton and Logan, Working Paper No. 63, 13.  
99 Michael Bratton, Voting and Democratic Citizenship in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013), 
197–218. 
100 Ibid, 2. 
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The average Nigerian citizen needs to be enjoined at a grassroots level, and this 
has been the most significant hurdle yet to be scaled. Over the years, Nigeria has seen 
vigorous civil society activity in mobilizing for democracy. Labor unions, women’s 
groups, and the press have all taken active roles that ebbed and flowed over the years. 
The different military or civilian regimes, however, have exerted equally active efforts to 
undermine and reverse civil society’s the gains. 
In addition to the efforts previously mentioned, the regimes’ strategies General 
Buhari’s decrees banning unions and dismantling the rights of workers to organize, his 
muzzling of the press by authorizing arrests for “false accusations against public 
officials” from 1983 to 1985, and subsequent administrations’ repressive tactics, which 
ranged from using spies to infiltrate and subvert agendas to the assassination of 
leadership of independent media outlets.101 These combined subversive efforts splintered 
any cohesion in civil society efforts, and the state succeeded in creating a divide between 
the average disenfranchised citizen and CSOs. 
Aiyede goes on to say that civil society in Nigeria has been primarily elite-driven. 
The prodemocracy associations were initiated mainly by elites who had a lot to lose with 
the increasingly overbearing military dictatorships. This group included leaders of labor 
unions and professional associations that were concerned about the impact of state 
economic restructuring measures, and human rights NGOs, which leveraged international 
funding and attention to press for the release of colleagues who had been detained.102 
These points go to Aiyede’s more general emphasis on the political “disengagement” of 
the grassroots citizen from civil society.103 Consequently, while unemployed youth in 
urban areas may be mobilized to riot and march in Nigeria, the average grassroots citizen 
does not yet see the link between participating in these associations and “resolving deep-
seated national problems.”104 The trauma from years of failed leadership and elite issue-
driven initiatives are two explanations for this level of disengagement. 
101 Ibid., 7.  
102 Aiyede, “The Dynamics of Civil Society,” 15–16. 
103 Ibid., 11. 
104 Ibid. 
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E. WEAKENING OF TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS (INDIRECT RULE) 
Essential to a comprehensive understanding of the current political and social 
failures in Nigeria must be a historical understanding of the development of government 
and political institutions. The role of the citizen and state are placed in a more relevant 
context when analyzed from a historical perspective. At the beginning of the 
establishment of British colonies in Nigeria at the turn of the 19th century, early 
European explorers interacted with the various indigenous groups that occupied the 
territory, as depicted by Figure 2. 
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 Figure 2.  Major ethnic-group dispersion105 
These groups, mainly composed of Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo, were 
organized into various independent geopolitical structures.106 For the purpose of this 
thesis, traditional institutions of governance refer to the systems of governance that have 
carried over to the present since precolonial times. In Nigeria, obas, igwes, sultans, emirs, 
105 From BBC News Africa, Nigeria Elections: Mapping a Nation Divided; 
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31101351?fb_ref=Default.  The map is not the exact representation of 
1899 but is meant to depict the major ethnic groups.  The country borders did not exist in 1899; therefore, 
an inclusive map of Africa would reflect the Kanuri spread into Cameroun, Chad, and Niger. Likewise, the 
Yoruba would be spread west into Benin. 
106  Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 94. 
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and other titled chiefs are ranked into first-, second-, and third-tier structures. The 
honorable Justice of Ogun State provides a list of various federal and state chiefs’ laws 
and edicts that guide the incorporation of traditional structure into the government 
structures, including, Chiefs’ Appointment and Deposition Law of Ekiti state; the Chiefs’ 
Edicts of Imo, Ogun, Ondo, Benue, Osun, and Oyo states; the Western Region 
Appointment and Recognition of Chiefs Law; the Traditional Rulers and the Autonomous 
Communities Law No. 11 of 1981 Imo state.107 
1. Traditional Northern Institutions (Northern Caliphates) 
In the north, the Hausa and Fulani formed a highly centralized and powerful 
Islamic composed of emirates under one caliphate. The Kanuri and other ethnic groups 
also had strong centralized caliphates with similar emirships. The governmental 
institutions of the emirates had well-established military, security, educational, taxation 
and fiscal systems, as well as judiciary and communication or Kofa108 systems between 
the caliphate’s central government in Sokoto —headed by the sultan—and the outlying 
emirates. Occasional uprisings of different emirs from the 1700s to 1903 suggest that, 
while not perfect, the northern economy, culture, and political institutions were united 
through the Islamic religion under varying levels of Shari’a law across the different 
emirates.109 Ironically, this highly centralized structure made the caliphate the ideal 
candidate for British “indirect rule”—described as “using local authorities and power 
structure to rule rather than imposing external force.”110 This reduced direct colonial 
influence and presence in the north would have long-standing implications over the years 
since independence until present. The current political system in the northern part of 




108 Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 67. Kofa systems were instituted to improve 
communications between the caliph and the emirs. They also served as the means of collecting required 
tribute from emirs. (page 67 of A History of Nigeria) 
109 Ibid., 69–73. 
110 Stephen Wright, Nigeria: Struggle for Stability and Status (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 
11. 
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submit to the religion, while Christians and others in the north (about one-third of 
population in that region) are subject to the civil laws of Nigeria. Shari’a and civil law 
operate congruently based on the choice of the individual and in line with his or her faith. 
2. Traditional Southwest Institution (Yoruba) 
The Yoruba Empire historically dominates the southwestern region. The 
precolonial empire encompassed 14 kingdoms extended over a vast area and organized 
into sophisticated forms of a centralized government headed by the alafin (king) of Oyo 
and city-states headed by chiefs or related proxies of the king. The Yorubas are very 
homogenous and subscribed to the traditional institutions where the royal lineage 
leadership of kings and chiefs, from the central state to the outlying provinces, served 
political, religious, military, and related administrative functions in support of their 
constituents.111 Despite their homogeneity, divisions between various kingdoms over the 
years led to a series of wars between the Yoruba provinces, weakening the empire, and 
which were “ended only with the negotiation of peace in 1886 by the British, who used 
the opportunity to gain a foothold in Yoruba land. British intervention ultimately resulted 
in the consolidation of a protectorate, which initiated colonial rule in the region in 
1893.”112 The centralized nature of traditional Yoruba institutions along with the 
inadvertent arbiter role facilitated the imposition of British rule. 
3. Traditional Southeast Institutions (Ibo) 
The southeastern region is composed mainly of the Ibo tribe, a more egalitarian 
society. Unlike the other two main groups, the Ibo were amorphous and loosely 
organized and had no strong political institutions before the British intervention. Instead, 
they had a fairly republican structure manifested through varying levels of “village 
government maintained by family heads or elders sitting together in consultation with the 
senior elder, or okpara, who chaired meetings but did not rule.”113 The decentralized 
nature of authority of the Ibo and the smaller tribes in the eastern region proved 
111 Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 50.  
112 Ibid., 76. 
113 Wright, Nigeria, 11. 
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challenging for the subsequent British “indirect rule” model.114 The challenges still 
resonate in the Delta region that is a part of the southeast. Ascendancy to Ibo chieftaincy 
is based on the candidate’s curriculum vitae, which captures achievements and efforts 
that have improved the community. 
F. FIRST STAGES OF TRADITIONAL INSTITUTION EROSION 
The weakening of traditional forms of governance can be traced as far back as the 
slave-trade era. From precolonial through independence, the state-level effort to 
neutralize the power of these institutions continues till present day. 
As a result of the different structures of authorities and institutions in the three 
main geographical regions and over a forty-year period ending in 1903 with the 
occupation of Sokoto, the British approached colonization (development and 
administration) differently in each region.115 In the southwest and east, Christianity 
spread quickly and firmly for one particular reason: “Leaders of the southwest recognized 
the link between Christian missionaries and British military power. .. therefore [the 
traditional leaders] saw Christian missionaries as ambassadors through whom they could 
enlist British support against their enemies.”116 Among other things, the missionaries 
also established schools that taught English speaking, reading, and writing, which the 
traditional leader felt provided an economic advantage in trade negotiations with the 
British.117 Conversely, as they pushed further inland from the coastal regions, 
missionaries bent on spreading their faith and eradicating the slave trade and uncivilized 
animist traditions and beliefs lobbied for more British protection and a stronger British 
intervention in established traditional institutions.118 Growing trade interests, which are 
discussed in Chapter IV, also influenced British colonization. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 85. 
116 Ibid., 88. 
117 Ibid., 87–88. 
118 Ibid., 89. 
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The erosion of traditional institutions began in earnest in 1851 when the British 
used military force to depose the reigning king of Lagos (Kosoko, who resisted overt 
missionary and British trade activity), replacing him with a more amenable ruler who 
subsequently was unable to enforce structure and control over the region. His failure led 
to the region’s political collapse and the transition from traditional institutions to British 
rule under a British governor in 1861.119 Between 1861 and 1894, the British would use 
military coercion and bombardment to force most of the Yoruba leaders, (including all 
the strongest kingdoms such as Ijebu and Oyo) to sign away their sovereignty and join 
the expanding colony.120 In the southeast and Delta region of the Ibo and smaller tribes, 
the period of the 1840s through 1885 saw the demolishment or bombardment of 
communities as the British became “kingmakers,”121 creating or replacing local rulers 
and councils with new ones or forcing the current ones to accept British rule. In all 
instances, the newly established foreign political and judicial institutions undermined the 
sovereign authority of the indigenous rulers. 
The final push through the hinterlands to the north culminated in 1903 with the 
installation of a new and more amenable sultan in Sokoto.122 For Frederick Luggard, who 
would become the first high commissioner of the new colony, the distance, the expanse 
of the northern caliphate, and associated maintenance costs precluded further 
administrative interference. As a result, the British tactic in the north was to strike 
agreements to not interfere with the Muslim religion and to prevent Christian 
missionaries from migrating into Muslim territories. In exchange, “the emirate 
mechanism. .. [with] its ability to control and tax the northern population, was retained to 
levy taxes to be passed over to the colonial authorities in return for allowing the emirs to 
retain some traditional power and authority within the region—even though the north was 
still under the supreme authority of the crown.”123 The autonomy retained in the north 
119 Ibid., 95. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., 96. 
122 Wright, Nigeria, 14. 
123 Ibid., 15. 
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was not the same policy applied in the south. Additionally, the 1914 amalgamation of all 
regions facilitated the use of income generated in the southwest, to cover operating and 
other expenses of the northern and eastern regions. This unique dynamic of an 
autonomous north reliant on southern funds, would reverberate through colonial times, 
independence, and to the present day. 
The current structure of traditional institutions is one where hereditary and 
appointment measures are both utilized. Kingmakers (i.e, Oyo Mesi in Yoruba proper)124 
and ruling houses are factors in determining chieftaincies in modern-day Nigeria. The 
federal government also has a vote in some cases, which has sullied the once-venerated 
determination of kings. The 2014 appointment of the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Sanusi 
Lamido, devolved into a tumultuous volley of allegations and counterallegations when 
the kingmakers picked Lamido but the federal government designated someone else.125 
The kingmakers’ decision was upheld—partly owing to the civil protests that erupted. 
The federal government issues the final approval and certificates for all 
paramount ruler positions. In the modern-day governance structure, chiefs and kings 
serve in advisory capacity to various tiers of government. The most significant role they 
have held in contemporary times was during the Shagari Regime from 1979 to 1983, 
when first class obas and chiefs (i.e., paramount rulers) were designated as pro-
chancellors of universities in an effort to facilitate their participation in passing on 
traditions and educating the youth of Nigeria. Today, most obas and chiefs perform in a 
ceremonial capacity to mobilize local community development efforts, but primarily as a 
reminder of history and culture to the citizens.126 
 
124 Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yoruba’s (Lagos, Nigeria: CSS Bookshops Limited, 1921), 50.  
125 www.vanguardngr.com/2014/06/paradox-sanusis-emirship/ 
126 Comments on the traditional structure were provided by Dr. Oluwole Songonuga and the 
Honorable Chief Justice Olopade of Ogun State. 
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G. EMERGENCE OF NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION 
As amalgamation and indirect rule became entrenched, the number of Western-
educated personnel grew in all areas of social life. Ideas of self-rule began to take hold, 
spreading through churches, women’s groups, and trade groups. These ideas were spread 
by a rapidly growing independent media. To the detriment of traditional institutions, the 
primary focus of most of the new associations was to counter the Western perception that 
Africans were uneducated and incapable of self-rule; as a result, many traditional 
attributes were actively replaced with Western ones. 
1. Elite and Mass Mobilization 
In the southwest, and Lagos in particular, the British governor established a 
legislative council that employed newly formed “traditional elites” to advise the governor 
on “traditional Yoruba law regarding such issues as land ownership, marriage customs, 
and ceremonial procedures.”127 As the European-educated middle-class elite grew in 
numbers, the aversion to the British notion that Africans were inferior to Europeans also 
grew and would manifest itself in form of new African-led churches that took a divergent 
approach to traditional and cultural rights. The 1920s and 1930s also saw the emergence 
of an independent press that began to criticize the oppressive and prejudicial colonial 
regime.128 While the educated elite promulgated their message and the nationalism drive 
through churches and the press, Falola and Heaton also highlight the shared discontent 
and subsequent mobilization of “working class-Nigerians and peasant farmers” who were 
fed up with being alienated by traditional chiefs and kings. According to them, “whereas 
chiefs and kings had traditionally maintained power by ruling in a fashion that pleased 
their subjects, under colonial rule traditional elites maintained their power by pleasing the 
British colonial authorities first and foremost.”129 These frustrations, along with the 
imposition of taxes in the southwest region in particular, would culminate in mass 
127 Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 114. 
128 Ibid., 130–131. 
129 Ibid., 132. 
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demonstrations and riots in 1929—led by women and called the Women’s War.130 The 
colonial government’s response to the civil mobilization, while limited, was to restructure 
the administrative system in a more localized and representative manner to suit its needs. 
Ironically, the mobilization of the peasant and the European elite educated class forced 
the colonial authority to expand African representation on the central governments 
legislative council. This response by the colonial powers was to ensure division among 
Nigerians by appeasing the opposition. Meanwhile, the continued use of coopted 
traditional chiefs and elders instead of the educated elites fomented tensions both 
between elites and traditional rulers and along ethnic lines, which suited the colonial 
powers initially.131 
2. New Forms of Civic Associations 
Numerous other associations were formed to represent an educated and capable 
Nigeria. These institutions’ initial goal was to counter the Western perception that 
Africans were inferior to the foreigners who occupied the administration immediately 
following independence. These organizations evolved into the CSOs that led the drive for 
independence and democracy. Through each administration, the drive to assimilate into 
the global society and the paradigm of democracy meant building connections beyond 
ethnicity. As a result, the First Republic destroyed that connection for the tribal 
institutions that survived colonialism in cases where citizens relied on local councils for 
problem resolution or as a conduit for resources and other administrative solutions. The 
persistent political deposing or investigating of local community councils ultimately 
broke the trust citizens had in those institutions.132 Today, most traditional authorities are 
ceremonial in nature and often appointed by contemporary politicians, who use the 
connection to validate their legitimacy in a particular ethnic group—primarily for 
mobilizing electoral votes. Being coopted by the administration renders these traditional 
institutions ineffective for civic mobilization to challenge the establishment. 
130 Ibid., 133. 
131 Wright, Nigeria, 21. 
132 Peil, Nigerian Politics, 140. 
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H. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown the systematic weakening of the traditional institutions 
that advocated for the needs of its citizens. The advent of independence and the influx of 
educated Nigerian elites, plus the changing dynamics of a global push to democratization, 
ultimately pressured the new Nigerian elites to move to less tribal forms of advocacy. 
The resulting CSOs conformed to theoretical Western ideas of representation—evidenced 
by a successful push for independence, and an end to military rule. Unfortunately, these 
modern forms of advocacy have failed the citizenry, as they have been incapable of 
pushing successive administrations to act in a sustained representative manner. As a 
result, the average Nigerian citizen is disconnected from civil society, which in turn is 
disconnected from the state. As this chapter suggests, the reasons for such disconnect 
include an elite-centered agenda, a lack of unity and focus among CSOs, and a record of 
failed efforts in dealing with a closed Nigerian state. Chapter III addresses the entrenched 
lines of mistrust that has evolved over the various administrations and leads into Chapter 
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III. TRUST AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
This chapter starts with a review of the perspectives found in the literature on 
trust, social capital, and civil society. After establishing the necessity of trust in building 
and maintaining associations, by focusing on Francis Fukuyama’s 2001 paper on social 
capital, the chapter depicts how the circle of mistrust has metastasized over the years in 
Nigeria—specifically, historical events and military actions over the course of various 
civilian and military administrations. The thesis also acknowledges the challenges 
inherent in measuring trust. Despite that weakness, this thesis agrees with the argument 
that trust and social capital are vital parts of congealing civic participation and 
associations and mobilizing that resulting civil society into actionable pressure on the 
government. By extension, the erosion of trust in Nigeria correlates to the inability of 
civil society to make the state provide representative governance to citizens. 
A. TRUST IN THE SOCIAL REALM 
Research on trust centers on two different circles: social and political. Each 
influences the other in varying degrees and as a result of numerous factors. Additionally, 
the terminology is dependent on the researcher. What political scientists William Mishler 
and Richard Rose call trust, Fukuyama calls social capital. For the purpose of this thesis, 
the essential element of trust in social or political circles is that it can be learned or 
earned and unlearned or unearned. Trust is performance based—especially in the political 
arena. In the social arena, it is essential for breaking down barriers and developing shared 
interests. To link the concept to the citizen, civil society, and the state, Mishler and Rose 
consolidate the research of social theorists such as Adam Seligman and S.N. Eisenstadt, 
who argue that “trust is essential to the establishment of civil society, the institutions of 
which create within citizens a sense of community and connect them to government.”133 
At the individual participatory level, Mishler and Rose summarize the argument of 
theorists such as Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, Jae-On Kim, and Robert Dahl and posit that 
133 William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Trust, Distrust, and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil 
and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies,” Journal of Politics 59, no.2 (1997): 419. 
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trust is necessary so that individuals may participate voluntarily in 
collective institutions, whether in political institutions, such as political 
parties, or in economic and social institutions, such as labor unions, 
business associates, and churches. Trust in civil institutions does not 
diminish democracy but completes it, enhancing the effectiveness of 
political institutions, creating the “social separation of powers” which 
checks the emergence of an overly strong State.134 
In this respect, researchers Nojin Kwak, Dhavan Shah, and R. Lance Holbert agree, 
emphasizing that trust is essential to shape the efforts of smaller associations that grow 
into wider civic engagement and collective action. These informal or formal settings 
ultimately foster discussion on “political issues and mobilization and resource and 
community building.”135 In their study of postcommunist nations in Europe, Mishler and 
Rose also cite the findings of Ronald Inglehart, David Easton, and others who argue that 
the values and benefits individuals perceive to determine trust are usually a result of 
factors such as education, gender, age, and socioeconomic status.136 
B. TRUST IN THE POLITICAL REALM 
Like social trust, political trust is heavily influenced by personal experience. 
Kenneth Newton argues that while both are important on their own merits and critical for 
a democracy, the two are also very different. Newton’s analysis led him to conclude that 
membership in voluntary organizations does not highly affect political trust. Yet social 
trust is influenced by a plethora of factors, to include those identified by Mishler and 
Rose, and voluntary organizations.137 Furthermore, Newton surmises that political trust 
requires a certain level of distrust to be a necessary component for providing adequate 
scrutiny of political behavior.138 The level of distrust influences a range of things from 
134 Ibid. 
135 Nojin Kwak, Dhavan V. Shah and R. Lance Holbert, “Connecting, Trusting, and Participating: 
The Direct and Interactive Effects of Social Associations,” Political Research Quarterly 57, no 4, (2004): 
643 and 645. 
136 Mishler and Rose, “Trust, Distrust, and Skepticism,” 434. 
137 Kenneth Newton, “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy,” International Political 
Science Review 22, no. 2, (2001): 204. 
138 Ibid., 205.  
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the likelihood of citizens’ paying taxes to their not reelecting politicians who have lost 
that trust. 
Building on Newton’s assessment of political trust being a report card on 
government performance, political scientists Marc Hutchison and Kristin Johnson 
conducted a study of trust in 16 African countries over the period spanning 2000 to 2005. 
Using 32 different Afrobarometer surveys, they found that African countries with poor 
institutional capacity in functional areas such as legal systems, corrupt police forces, and 
corrupt bureaucracies all inspire low levels of political trust from citizens.139 Their 
conclusions are reasonable and unsurprising specifically as they relate to fractured states. 
In a complementary but less specific study, Francis Fukuyama reaches conclusions that 
build on all the main points espoused by the researchers previously discussed. His insight 
also presents the most ideal setting in which to examine the issue of trust in Nigeria. 
C. SOCIAL CAPITAL: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL TRUST 
Francis Fukuyama states, “Social Capital is an instantiated informal norm that 
promotes cooperation between two or more individuals.”140 He describes social capital as 
a norm that develops over time to facilitate cooperation between two parties. Much like 
trust, social capital also develops and evolves into shared norms when “virtues like 
honesty, keeping of commitments, reliable performance of duties, [or] reciprocity”141 
have been observed and exhibited. While Fukuyama stresses the positive potentiality of 
social capital, he cites Partha Dasgupta’s research by discussing the “positive and 
negative externalities” of social capital.142 Positive equates to treating all people 
morally—and having the capacity to extend courtesies beyond a nuclear group that shares 
the same norms, but to a wider social group; negative externalities equates a more stunted 
139 Marc L. Hutchison and Kristin Johnson, “Capacity to Trust? Institutional Capacity, Conflict, and 
Political Trust in Africa, 2000–2005,” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 6 (2011): 737–752. 
140 Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development,” Third World Quarterly 22, 
no. 1 (2001): 7. 
141 Ibid., 8. 
142 Ibid. 
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sharing of norms—where members outside the nucleus or cooperative of shared norms 
are viewed with hostility.143 
These circles of shared norms lead to cooperation and are often at the crux of 
groups ranging from ethnic tribes to religions and wider associations of cooperation. The 
challenge to highly fragmented societies such as Nigeria is that circles of trust need to 
widen, and that occurs through the development of overlapping social groups to which 
people belong. Fukuyama rightly warns that fragmented societies are often characterized 
by an us-versus-them mentality. The circle of trust can be limited to such a narrow group 
that the government is perceived as being far outside that circle and stealing from the 
government to give to the circle of trust is not condemned.144 
At this very point theorists such as Tocqueville would inject the value of 
democracy. Democracy offers people the opportunity to organize and associate in groups 
that are “important for all aspects of their lives.”145 If that happens and larger circles of 
trust are built, citizens have more leverage when they choose to participate in the political 
dialogue. When larger circles of trust develop, the foundations for a dense civil society—
one that will balance the power of the government structure—is firmly in place.146 But 
first, citizens must see the value in associations, and Nigerians have yet to see the value 
in these associations. 
The roots of distrust were sown as far back as the First Republic in the political 
maneuvering that unfolded during the British turnover of power. The southwest, the most 
westernized and containing the most educated administrators able to effectively run the 
government, was represented by the Action Group (AG) party chaired by Obafemi 
Awolowo, a Yoruba. The north was represented by the Northern People’s Congress 
(NPC) and led by Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, who was named the first prime minister as 
Nigeria prepared for independence. According to the 1958 census report, the north won 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid., 9. 
145 Ibid., 11. 
146 Ibid. 
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the most seats in the new central government legislature.147 Allying with the NPC to 
sway votes in support of Balewa, the eastern region, represented by the National Council 
of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) and led by Nnamdi Azikwe, was primarily Ibo. The 
overwhelming strength of regional identities over a loosely constructed national identity 
was pervasive and instilled high levels of fear, which paralyzed the ability to develop any 
cross-regional associations and build trust. 
As Falola and Heaton state, “The greatest fear of most Nigerians in the 1960s was 
that their region would become ‘dominated’ by another.”148 By 1964, the level of 
corruption and “ethnic baiting” left most Nigerians believing that the federal system 
needed to be disbanded; this belief set the stage for the first military overthrow in 1966 
and the subsequent bloody civil war from 1967 to 1970.149 The Biafran war of secession 
revealed the level to which trust had eroded and was marked by broken alliances that 
remain in modern Nigerian politics and society.  
As if speaking of Nigeria, Fukuyama accurately describes the adverse effects of 
having low levels of social capital—it leaves the state unchecked, creating the space for 
rent seeking and corruption—and captures the trust climate existing in Nigeria. Specific 
to this thesis, Fukuyama’s discussion of how the state indirectly fosters or hinders the 
creation of social capital through its ability to “provide necessary public goods, 
particularly property rights and public safety” is particularly relevant as it ties together 
the previous discussions on political trust as a product of state performance and the 
erosion effect of coercive forces that take over when the civilian state leaves a power 
vacuum.150 
 
147 Falola and Heaton, A History of Nigeria, 158. 
148 Ibid., 159. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society,” 18. 
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D. THE MILITARY AS AN AGENT OF DISTRUST 
For Nigeria, the impact of the successive military regimes has been detrimental to 
prospects of building political trust and social capital. After receiving high praises for 
removing a corrupt civilian administration, in his 1966 inaugural speech Lt. Col. Yakubu 
Gowon stated 
Fellow countrymen, I sincerely hope we shall be able to resolve most of 
the problems that have disunited us in the past and really come to respect 
and trust one another in accordance with an all-around code of good 
conduct and etiquette…Troops must not terrorize the public, as such 
action will discredit the new National Military Government. You are to 
remember that your task is to help restore law and order and confidence in 
the public in time of crisis…I promise you that I shall do all I can to return 
to civil rule as soon as it can be arranged.”151 
When the civil war ended in 1970, Gowon again promised to relinquish control to 
democratic rule in 1976. As the years passed, the promise faded because of the 
concentration of wealth at the federal level and the ease with which personal wealth could 
be amassed. The drive for wealth and political influence superseded the promises made 
by the military and set up the country for the next coup and military administration in 
1976. Max Siollun describes the coup as a watershed moment because for the first time 
“executors of a coup apportioned political appointments between themselves.”152 
Military actions worsened as evinced by the Buhari regime of 1983–1985, when 
calls for return to civil rule resulted in the muzzling or disbandment of CSOs, labor 
unions, and other professional associations. The decrees discussed in Chapter II heavily 
criminalized associational acts and inclinations and “placed the government above the 
law by removing all actions of the government from the jurisdiction of the courts.”153 
Fukuyama’s reference to rent-seeking behavior becomes endemic during the Babangida 
regime of 1985–1993. As the regime implemented the SAPs that resulted in a dramatic 
fall of living standards across the country, calls for change and civilian rule were again 
151 Max Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria’s Military Coup Culture (1966–1976), (New 
York: Algora, 2009), 231–232. 
152 Ibid., 185. 
153 Aiyede, “The Dynamics of Civil Society,” 6.  
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met with active cooptation of civil associations and community leaders and the institution 
of nepotism, which further eroded any potential remnants of trust. 
Aiyede describes a scenario where the regimes of Babangida and his successor, 
Abacha, either bought off segments of civic organizations that voiced opposition or 
instituted a network of spies and secret agents and complemented such tactics with the 
assassinations of leading journalists and activists such as Dele Giwa in 1986 and Ken 
Saro Wiwa in 1995.154 The annulment of the 1993 presidential elections that would have 
brought back civilian rule under Abiola instead ushered in the Abacha regime and led to 
high levels of violence and militancy.155 Such acts made citizens suspicious of each 
other, eroded trust in associations and the government, and instilled fear across the board. 
E. CORRUPTION: THE ENDURING ENGINE OF TRUST EROSION 
Corruption is the enduring cause of distrust among all elements of the private and 
public fabric of society. This thesis subscribes to the World Banks’ two-part definition of 
corruption. The first type is state capture, defined as 
actions of individuals, groups, or firms in both the public and private 
sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees, and other 
government policies (that is, the basic rules of the game) to their own 
advantage by means of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private 
benefits to public officials.156 
The second form of corruption is administrative corruption which is manipulating 
existing laws to “provide advantages to either state or non-state actors as a result of the 
illicit and non-transparent provision of private gain to public officials.”157 Essentially, 
this is the redirection of public funds into private coffers. In Nigeria, the history of 
corruption is extensive and encompasses both definitions. 
More disturbing is the fact that despite numerous anticorruption initiatives, 
corruption is rampant. Examples of the initiatives include: 
154 Ibid., 8–10. 
155 Ibid., 11. 
156 Human Rights Watch, Rivers State, 17. 
157 Human Rights Watch, Rivers State, 17–18. 
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1. The Nigerian Constitution, which specifically mandates a code of conduct 
for public officials to mitigate corruption;158 
 
2. President Obasanjo’s Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 
(CPROA) in 1999,159 which led to the creation of the Independent Corrupt 
Practice Commission (ICPC) in 2000;160 
 
3. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2002;161 
 
4. Regional ECOWAS and continental-level initiatives such as the New 
Action Plan for Africa Development (NEPAD), which aim to expunge 
corrupt practices from development partnerships between African and 
non-African countries;162 
 
5. The African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption in 2003;163 and, 
 
6. Efforts in conjunction with the G8 and the OECD to increase transparency 
on revenue and income from the oil and mineral trade.164 
Pressured by CSOs, Nigeria joined the United Kingdom–led Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative aimed at increasing visibility on all transactions between 
companies, governments, and government entities.165 All these initiatives are aimed at 
proscribing corruption, yet the problem persists. The laws are in place, but the 
enforcement and willingness to abide by said laws is severely lacking. Despite the laws 
and regulations mandating transparency, to include CSO pressure via the “Publish What 
You Pay” and “Publish What You Earn” campaigns (aimed specifically at increasing 
158 Nigerian Constitution (1999) Schedule 5 section as cited by Ijeoma Opara, “Nigerian Anti-
Corruption Initiatives,” Journal of International Business and Law 6, no.1, article 4, (2007): 76–78 
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1137&context=jibl. 
159 Ibid., 70. The 2003 update to CPROA is also referenced as ongoing government initiatives. 
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1137&context=jibl. 
160 Ibid., 77. 
161 Ibid., 79. 
162 Ibid.,79.  
163 Ibid., 80.  
164 Ibid., 72. 
165 Ibid., 74. 
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visibility in the oil industry),166 transparency remains elusive, and corruption, in turn, 
thrives in such obscurity. 
1. Leadership and Policymaking in a Trust-Deficit Environment 
Afrobarometer created the Transparent and Accountable Governance Index 
(TAGI), composed of 13 survey questions, to measure the level in which 34 African 
governments are perceived as transparent and open by their constituents.167 The score is 
then compared to other measures of transparency such as the Resource Governance Index 
(RGI), which is produced by Revenue Watch International and examines 58 countries 
with extractive industries, and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), which is 
produced by Mo Ibrahim Foundation and evaluates 52 African countries across four 
categories to determine the governments’ ability to meet their obligations to their 
constituencies.168 
With a TAGI index of 0.68, Nigeria ranked 25th of 34 Afrobarometer countries 
and received a not open designation. With a low 40 percentile score on both the RGI and 
IIAG, Nigeria proved to be consistent across all matrices for high corruption, low 
transparency, low accountability and consistently low efficacy at meeting its obligation to 
its constituency.169 Surveys and statistics such as these merely codify what Nigerians 
166 Ibid. 
167 TAGI looks at 34 African countries, including all 22 extractive industry countries. It is devised by 
rescaling and averaging responses to the 13 survey questions for each respondent, then computing a 
country average. The score is then used to rank all 34 countries into four categories: very open, with TAGI 
scores of between 0.96 and 1.15; fairly open, with scores between 0.87 and 0.94; not open, with scores 
between 0.65 and 0.83; and not all open, with scores between 0.49 and 0.59. All scores can be found on 
Table 2: Transparent and Accountable Governance Score in Afrobarometer, “Oil & Mining Countries: 
Transparency Low, Impunity High,” (11 December 2013), 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/policy_brief/ab_r5_policybriefno6.pdf. 
168 RGI is produced for 58 countries with sizeable extractive industries; encompassing four categories 
of variables: institutional and legal setting; reporting practices; safeguards and quality control; enabling 
environment. IIAG covers 52 African counties and the index consists of four main categories: safety and 
rule of law; participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunities; and human development. 
Compiled by combining over 100 variables from more than 30 independent African and global sources, the 
IIAG is the most comprehensive collection of data on African governance. 
www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iiag/. 
169 Afrobarometer, “Oil and Mining Countries,” Table 2, Figure 10A and 10b. 
www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/policy_brief/ab_r5_policybriefno6.pdf. 
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experience—despite the pledges and reform efforts that are published by each new state 
or federal administration. 
Echoing the sentiments of the indices on lack of transparency in the Nigerian 
government, Dr. Aminu Magashi, a medical professional who writes on the state of 
health governance in Nigeria, looks at the lack of transparency in the budgeting process 
in Nigeria—and specifically, how that lack affects the country’s health budget and 
planning. The four-day Advocacy for Women’s and Children’s Health Conference in 
August of 2013 was organized by the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child 
Health (PMNCH), the World Health Organization (WHO), and other relevant 
development partners. Nigerian CSO stakeholders as well as government representatives 
were in attendance to gain insight into developing budget advocacy strategies—the 
premise being that these individuals on the CSO and government representative side 
would have access and knowledge of the same information as it related to the Nigerian 
Ministry of Health’s and the overall national plan. The inability of Nigerian CSOs and 
media to engage in critical planning, costing, and advocacy discussions was inadequate at 
best due to three independently corroborated factors that Magashi identifies as 
attributable to a lack of budget transparency by the Nigerian Ministry of Health: 
1. Nigeria scored 16 percent in Open Budget Index, earning a designation of 
implied scant or no information as it relates to measurement of budget 
transparency, the publishing of significant budget information, and 
participation.170 As a form of reference, Transparency International rates 
the current Open Budget Index at 18 percent—still the lowest 
designation.171 
 
2. Magashi cites a qualitative study by the Evidence for Action Project where 
23 percent of respondents “give a low score to the ease of accessing 
information on national health budget, maternal and health budget, and on 
maternal and health outcomes at the state and local government level.”172 
 
 
170 Aminu Magashi, “Nigeria: How Transparent in Nigeria’s Health Budget and Plan?” The Daily 
Trust, 24 September 2013, http://allafrica.com/stories/201309240487.html. 
171 Open Budget Index, Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/country#NGA. 
172 Ibid. 
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3. The Nigeria Accountability Framework, which assesses planning and 
implementation of health, scored very low marks for categories labeled 
“monitoring resources of the National Health Account (NHA).” 
Additionally, federal steering committees did not have local or CSO 
involvement; and while the federal health ministry had an officially 
approved framework for the NHA, the committee only functioned in an ad 
hoc capacity with “no clear system and budget line to support tracking of 
expenditures at all levels.”173 
Magashi emphasizes the lack of access to information and the close-hold 
tendency of the Nigerian government as it relates to resources that have been specifically 
set aside for health. When funding streams, budgets, the framework with which health 
budgets are developed and executed, the manner in which issues are lobbied or advocated 
is not transparent, the trust deficit is exacerbated.174 
 Circumstances such as Magashi describes further illustrate the lack of trust that 
exists between CSOs and the government, even when structured attempts to collaborate 
are made. 
TI’s and the UNDP’s efforts to map corruption and governance in sub-Saharan 
Africa echo the same sentiments regarding the lack of transparency and accountability in 
tracking public health expenditures. TI implemented the Public Expenditure Tracking 
Surveys (PETS) in 14 countries and has been tracking these since 1996. The PETS were 
instituted to “track leakage of public funds or resources prior to reaching the intended 
beneficiary.”175 In 2007, the published report indicated that for the Nigerian health 
sector, “attempts to conduct PETS in the health sector have been seriously hampered by 
unreliable and inconsistent budgets and/or little systematic information on financial flows 
at facility level.”176 Magashi’s reporting seven years later show that not much has 
changed. 
173 Ibid. Also www.who.int/pmnch/media/events/2014/amhin.pdf?ua=1. 
174 Magashi, “Nigeria.”  
175 Transparency International, “Mapping of Corruption and Governance Measurement Tools in Sub-
Saharan Africa,” UNDP (December 2007): 61. 
176 Ibid., 62. 
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On a parallel trajectory, the removal of the oil subsidy in Nigeria was another 
example of lack of transparency in decision making at the federal level. Writing on the 
topic in 2012, Osita Ogbu, a visiting fellow at the Africa Growth Initiative posits that the 
first instance of deception related to the removal of the subsidy lay in the failure of 
President Goodluck Jonathan to include such a measure in his election platform—a 
measure which would have provided ample notification to the citizens (who would be 
most affected) and would have afforded the opportunity for citizen participation by 
voting on the measure. As a secondary option, Ogbu posits that the subsidy elimination 
would have been more palatable for citizens if the government had built domestic support 
by publishing a plan and then followed up with publicizing the gradual implementation of 
that plan. Ogbu suggests that if the grand plan had included complementary government 
actions such as “stabilizing electric power supply (most Nigerians rely on fuel based 
generators for power), repairs to strategic roads, prosecution of corrupt high-level 
officials and reallocating recouped funds to fuel balancing efforts; and finally, improving 
the efficiency of refineries to at least half their installed capacity,”177 all these efforts 
would have signified to the citizens that their government was attempting to mitigate and 
lessen the impact of such a drastic measure as cancelling oil subsidies. 
The gradual reduction in subsidies and ongoing debate as to their eventual 
removal is attributable to the lack of confidence in state and local governments who, in 
theory, would receive any income recouped from ending subsidies. These are the same 
governments who Nigerians currently do not trust in their management of existing 
funding streams. The fundamental issue, Ogbu posits, rests therein: The Nigerian 
federation is incapable of being accountable for the funds it currently manages. 
Eliminating subsidies amounts to robbing from the citizens (who do not have much) and 
increasing the amount that government officials will divert for private use.178 
January 15, 1966, is significant in the record of the first military coup in Nigeria. 
Major Nzeogwu, a key planner behind the coup, declared martial law in northern Nigeria 
177 Osita Ogbu, “The Removal of Oil Price Subsidy in Nigeria: Lessons in Leadership and 
Policymaking in a Trust-Deficit Environment,” Brookings Institute, January 26, 2012, 1–6 
www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/26-oil-subsidy-nigeria-ogbu 
178 Ibid., 5. 
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in a speech that referenced the reasons for the coup, the challenges that lay ahead, and the 
promise to citizens of Nigeria, 
Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and 
low places that seek bribes and demand 10 percent, those that seek to keep 
the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as 
minsters or VIPs at least, the tribalist, the nepotists, those that make the 
country look big for nothing before international circles, those that have 
corrupted our society and put the Nigeria political calendar back by their 
words and deeds. Like good soldiers we are not promising anything 
miraculous or spectacular. But what we do promise every law abiding 
citizen is freedom from fear and all forms of oppression, freedom from 
general inefficiency and freedom to live and strive in every field of human 
endeavor, both nationally and internationally.179 
Since that time, every military and civilian administration in Nigeria has stated 
something similar, yet 50 years later, none has taken adequate steps to provide budget 
and fiscal transparency and management—the first action required to mitigate the root 
cause: corruption. See Appendix 2 for the Africa Fiscal Transparency report for Nigeria 
as compiled by Internationalbudget.org. The budget process remains convoluted in a 
manner that guarantees the continuation of corrupt practices. 
2. The Niger Delta: Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State 
The federal government is not the only purveyor of corruption in Nigeria. The 
nature of the Nigerian Constitution means that responsibilities are shared among all three 
levels of government: the 36 states governments are further divided into 774 local 
government councils (LGCs).180 On a monthly basis, the federal government allocates 20 
percent of its revenue to the LGCs so they can fulfill their array of services to their 
constituents.181 LGCs may use any means to supplement their allocated funds, but most 
179 Siollun, Oil, Politics and Violence, 228. 
180 “Chop Fine:  The Human Rights Impact of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in 
Rivers State, Nigeria,” Human Rights Watch 19, no. 2(A), (January 2007): 11.  
181 Ibid 11–14. The federal government uses a criterion that results in a “roughly equitable distribution 
of income across most of the LGC.” Corruption in this area is recorded based on the number of LGCs in 
each state. Per the federal government computations, the most populous state in Nigeria, Lagos, has 20 
LGCs.  The second most populous state, Kano, has 47 LGCs. The end result is that Lagos State leaders 
over the last 15 years have supplemented their revenue by implementing the taxes. 
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LGCs do not.182 Of note, the amount of funds that LGCs receive is directly tied to the 
federal government’s income from oil—which in turn is based on global oil prices.183 
Additionally, oil-producing states rate up to an additional 13 percent of revenues from 
their region.184 The report also notes that state governments are mandated to contribute to 
LGCs in their constituencies—a mandate that is rarely met and is not enforced.185 In 
January 2007, the Human Rights Watch published a report using Rivers State, Nigeria 
(located in the oil rich Niger Delta region), to illustrate the impact of local government 
corruption. The case illustrates a phenomenon known as Chop money— Nigerian slang 
for embezzling government funds. The report ultimately illustrates the collusion between 
all levels of government in perpetuating corruption and leaving the poorest Nigerians 
without services, and thus further entrenching distrust within communities for all levels 
of government. 
Specific to this illustration, the health and educational responsibilities that are 
primarily LGC responsibility will be examined. Concerning health, the nation’s 13,000 
government-run healthcare centers are the responsibility of the LGC communities in 
which they are located.186 The 2007 report states that “local government responsibilities 
include building and maintaining the physical infrastructure of primary health centers, 
payment of staff salaries and stocking facilities with medicines and other necessary 
resources.”187 Concerning education, LGCs are funded to implement education policy 
and daily operations ranging from maintenance of school facilities to providing materials 
and amenities within their LGCs.188 
Per the report, Rivers State is Nigeria’s largest oil-producing state and has the 
wealthiest state government. It also has “23 LGCs that have been allocated more than 
182 The report notes that in many LGCs, the federally allocated funds amounts to up to 80 percent of 
LGCs total income and they are responsible for supplementing as needed.   
183 “Chop Fine,” 14. 
184 Ibid., 15. 
185 Ibid., 14. 




                                                 
$636 million from the federation account since 1999.”189 That said, it confounds 
reasonable thought when one analyzes the dismal failures in Rivers State in the context of 
the income the different levels of government administration receive. Although some 
progress has been made in recent years, the 2007 report ranked the Niger Delta region as 
one of the worst in terms of infant mortality and educational enrollment in 2006.190 
Citing 2004 revenue estimates of approximately a $6 billion allocation split between four 
oil-producing states in the Niger Delta (Rivers State was one of the four), the failure of 
funds to reach the intended targets fueled the rise of oil bunkering, kidnapping, violent 
protests, and militancy by such groups as the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND).191 
Closer examination presented in the report shows that phantom construction 
projects such as malls, schools, women’s centers, and office spaces (that often get 
abandoned before completion or do not physically exist), have trumped health and 
education needs.192 Further complicating the matter is the lack of transparency and 
accountability in budget development and reconciliation during the fiscal life cycle. This 
lack of transparency contributes to the “disappearance” of funds for line items such as 
salary bonuses that certain sectors of local government are entitled to receive.193 Other 
mismanagement examples include one LGC where the health sector budget was $23,000 
dollars while the travel budget for the chairman of the LGC was $53,800 dollars.194 At 
the Rivers State macro level, the depth of such fraud, waste, and abuse is better 
contextualized by comparing the Rivers State budget to that of other countries in 2006, as 
reflected in Table 1. 
 
189 Ibid., 25. 
190 Ibid., 20. 
191 Ibid., 23. Local government officials often cite heavy federal deductions for payment of salaries, 
which leaves the administration with little funds to perform any other services. 
192 Ibid., 29–31. 
193 Ibid., 34. 
194 Ibid., 37. 
 61 
                                                 
Table 1.   Comparison of population and 2006 budget of Rivers state against 
those of selected West African countries195 
Country/State Central Government Budget, 2006 Population 
Senegal $1.68 billion 11.7 million 
Rivers state, Nigeria $1.33 billion Between 4 and 5 million 
Mali $1.29 billion 10.5 million 
Guinea $642 million 8.44 million 
Niger $320 million 11.3 million 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
The current levels of violence and government mistrust that escalated in Nigeria 
in 2012 are similar to those of the 1990s. Fukuyama accurately describes the situation, 
saying, “People cannot associate, volunteer, vote, or take care of one another if they fear 
for their lives when walking down the street.”196 Years of authoritarian civil and military 
rule have impacted the development of circles of trust and left Nigerian citizens still 
searching for associations that they can rely on to develop institutions that foster a 
representative relationship.197 The trust is simply not there in the manner that Mishler 
and Rose describe. In terms of civil society and government, “Citizens must perceive the 
performance of political and civil institutions as providing some reasonable measure of 
individual and collective good.”198 In politics, trust is performance based; it is learned 
and can be unlearned. Chapter IV expands on the impact the broken economic model in 
Nigeria has had on fostering mistrust, ineffective institutions, and an unrepresentative and 
closed state. 
195 From Human Rights Watch, 2006, 76. 
196 Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society,” 18. 
197 Mishler and Rose, “Trust, Distrust and Skepticism,” 419. 
198 Ibid., 419. 
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IV. ECONOMIC POLICIES AND IMPACTS 
The Nigerian economy was primarily agriculture based before the discovery oil in 
the 1950s. The country once boasted the capability to produce enough food for both 
consumption and exportation. Since the shift to oil and natural resources, and to now 
importing food for consumption, the concept of the Dutch disease has led to a significant 
drop in investment in all other sectors of industry. The federal government controls 
access to the oil resources and manages the revenue rents generated from its export. Over 
the years, the elite group that has held federal-level positions has siphoned off billions of 
dollars in oil revenue to the detriment of the rest of the Nigerian populace. The impact of 
oil, corruption, income inequality, and poverty are all discussed in this chapter. Emphasis 
is placed on how a nontax-based revenue source serves to further disconnect the state 
from its constituents. 
Nigeria has failed to diversify its economy and has relied on oil-based rents as the 
primary source of revenue. Because oil is a commodity that requires heavy machinery for 
extraction and refining, the federal government has been able to control access and, by 
default, the income that comes from this resource. The mismanagement of the oil revenue 
over the course of 50 years has resulted in dismal inequality, high poverty rates, and an 
exorbitant amount of wealth in the hands of a limited elite. Other factors such as 
corruption, the weakness of institutions since colonial rule, and the enduring mistrust and 
conflict stemming from state borders that were randomly drawn with no consideration of 
ethnic, regional, or religious differences contribute to the economic stagnation. 
Additionally, the reasons behind the lack of economic growth extend to intangible 
elements such as the nature and character of individuals who comprise the government 
and the civil society. The interests that drive each of these components determine whether 
a state’s development and economic policies are sound and progressive—and directed 
toward advancing the welfare and safety of its constituency—or destructive and stagnant, 
with little regard for others outside the immediate power circle. The state is not an 
abstract entity; it is people who make good or bad policies. For the citizen, the choice lies 
in having the willingness to mobilize and demand responsive and responsible economic 
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policies—and change predatory leadership—or repeatedly acquiescing to economic and 
political practices that widen the inequality gap and perpetuate the unfulfilled potential of 
the Nigerian social and economic capital. 
This chapter explores how the people who comprise the state have made 
economic and policy decisions that have thus far failed to diversify the economy and how 
that further disconnects the citizen from the state. Overreliance on the extraction of 
primary commodities by foreign interests continues to leave Nigeria vulnerable to 
exogenous shocks such as the current global oil bust. History continues to repeat itself 
with regard to the effect of failed economic policies on the citizenry. The international 
community response thus far seems to be centered on providing a salve in the form of 
foreign aid to the Nigerian government. In exchange, for minimal interference in failed 
development and distribution policies, the international community is able to maintain 
access to extract Nigeria’s natural resources. This access translates to the continuous 
enrichment of a few members of the inner circle of the state and foreign interests. 
Indicators such as the gross domestic product (GDP) and gross national income (GNI) 
reveal the willingness of international interests and the Nigerian state and citizens to be 
pacified by Western measures of economic growth. The Inequality-Adjusted Human 
Development Index (IHDI) and Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), however, reveal 
the real impact of Nigeria’s economic policies on its citizens. 
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY 
From a historical perspective, the inception of the economic structure in Nigeria 
begins with the colonial administration that facilitated the creation of the state and the 
administrative architecture that set the tone for relations between the state and the citizen. 
The exploitative nature of colonial institutions is not debatable. Nonetheless, history 
shows that extractive commercial trade practices extend back to the early 19th century 
and included moving commodities such as high volumes of palm oil, rubber, cocoa, and 
timber from the Niger Delta to Europe.199 The trade routes in the north and coastal 
199 Heilbrunn, John Oil, Democracy, and Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2014), 70.Ibid., 70.  
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regions were controlled by an exclusive elite of middlemen (kings, chiefs, then finally 
British-sanctioned African firms) who highly benefited from trade with the Europeans.200 
The erosion of trust in traditional forms of authority links back to this critical time in the 
evolution of the Nigerian economy. As kings and chiefs built trade alliances with their 
European trading partners, the accountability links to their communities began to weaken, 
skewing in favor of increased influence with international power brokers for weapons 
(power and authority) and wealth. As social scientist John Heilbrunn states, 
“Participation in the governing structures meant nothing less than control over patronage 
positions and state largess. First, political elites used their positions to allocate jobs, 
money, and access to public contracts to their clients.”201 
That the British exploited these interests and divisions is evidenced by the 
regional amalgamation and regionalization of elites that persisted through the Nigerian 
independence. The British maximized the production of rubber, oil, and other cash crops 
in southern Nigeria—taking full advantage of the climate, the peasant labor, and the 
infrastructure that supported the full capacity by exporting resources in support of 
European industrial needs. Reinforcing the extractive ideology, the colonial 
administration built railroads in the vicinity of the resource sites and between staging and 
distribution areas across the country. They determined the prices for the commodities and 
controlled access to the external non-Nigerian markets that purchased the commodities. 
The British also compensated chiefs and kings, setting a one-sided leadership paradigm 
in favor of those with authority and access. 
Nigeria’s dependency on these easily marketable cash crops foreshadowed the 
lopsided reliance on oil in the modern Nigerian economic paradigm. Just as the British 
determined the prices during colonial times, Nigerian governments did not rely on the 
market to determine supply and demand. Instead, commodity prices were set by 
commodity market boards.202 Writing about the impact of these policies during the 1960s 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid., 71.  
202 T. Ademola Oyejide, The Effects of Trade and Exchange Rate Policies on Agriculture of Nigeria 
(Research Report 55) (Washington, DC,: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1986), 19. 
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and 1970s, T. Ademola Oyejide discusses the effect of the government’s efforts to 
stabilize supply by price fixing.203 The end result for farmers and producers was 
dependency on government subsidies and a diminished incentive to produce.204 
Agriculture was the trade of the citizens, the traditional export commodity that 
supported the Nigerian economy. Although exploited by the British during precolonial 
and colonial times, and later by the new Nigerian government, agriculture was labor 
intensive and a net export industry until the 1970s. By fixing prices below the 
international value, the Nigerian government essentially caused export farmers to lose 
heavy earnings potential from the international market and simultaneously decimated 
domestic food producers who could not compete with cheap imported foods. The boom 
associated with the exportation of oil represented a comparative advantage for Nigeria 
and had the potential to industrialize and expand the agricultural industry. Instead, the 
sector was neglected. Oyejide notes the drop of the agriculture sector’s share of total 
government revenue from “89 percent in 1960 to 4 percent in 1981.”205 A different 
perspective of the same phenomenon shows that annual food imports rose from less than 
$2 million in 1962 to an excess of $2 billion in 1984.206 Specifically looking across 
sectors, Oyejide provides a concise appreciation for the impact of the neglect of 









205 Ibid., 36. 
206 Ibid. 
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Table 2.   Changes in sectoral contributions to output, employment, and 
exports, 1970 and 1982207 
(in percent) Share of 
Output 
 Share of 
Employment 
 Share of 
Exports 
Sector 1970 1982  1970 1982  1970 1982 
Agriculture 48.78 22.19  75.00 59.00  71.90 2.40 
Oil & Mining 10.22 24.87  0.20 0.40  15.40 97.50 
Manufacturing 7.15 5.64  15.00 17.70  12.70 0.10 
Services 33.85 47.30  9.80 22.90  --- --- 
 
B. IMPACT OF OIL AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 
The emphasis on the management of resources as the root of Nigeria’s 
economical and developmental issues stems from the widely accepted premise that states 
with ample reserves of natural resources (in this case oil) are not automatically 
susceptible to the natural resource curse. The contrary is very possible. For example, in 
2013, Michael Ross writes, “Countries like Norway, Canada, and Great Britain, which 
have high incomes, diversified economies, and strong democratic institutions, have 
extracted lots of oil and had few ill effects.”208 Ross cites economists such as Jacob 
Viner, Arthur Lewis, and Melville Watkins, who argued in the 1950s and 1960s that such 
resources would help development, and posits that “countries blessed with natural 
resource wealth would be the exception, since they would have enough revenues to invest 
in the roads, schools, and other infrastructure that they needed to develop quickly.”209 
Ross drills down further to the point at which inefficiency enters the equation and 
suggests that relatively low production costs (i.e., the costs of extracting and associated 
payments to oil companies), are quickly overshadowed by the high rents that often 
accompany them. When the cost of extraction is subtracted from the cost per barrel, the 
remainder represents the rents that have historically been mismanaged in Third World 
countries like Nigeria. 
207 From Oyejide, Effects of Trade and Exchange Rate Policies, 36. 
208 Michael L.Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 2. 
209 Ibid. 
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The variance between extraction costs and rent per barrel across a selected 
number of countries in 2008 is illustrated in Figure 3.210 
 
Figure 3.   Oil prices and rents in selected countries211 
Heilbrunn supports Ross’ concerns about the proper management of oil revenue 
being the main vulnerability for political, economic, and social development in Third 
World countries.212 Heilbrunn goes a step further by identifying the strength of state 
institutions at the discovery of the natural resource as a critical indicator for the success 
or failure of resource and revenue management. He states: 
If politicians manage oil windfalls efficiently, the economy grows; 
payments for resource extractions smooth expenditure, and political 
leaders can set aside a percentage of the windfall earnings for future 
generations. If, on the other hand, the task exceeds policymakers’ abilities, 
the economy is vulnerable to a range of adverse economic outcomes. Price 
volatility exposes the economy to Dutch disease effects. In many States, 
political leaders are likely to divert revenues to satisfy their supporting 
coalitions or reinforce authoritarian rule. Outcomes, whether optimal or 
210 Ibid., 35. The graph depicted represents a variance ranging from US$6 per barrel in Canada to 
US$42 per barrel in Nigeria. 
211 After Ross, The Oil Curse,  36. This graph is an approximate recreation of the one in the book.  
The recreation strives to capture the significant variance between oil prices per barrel, actual extraction 
costs, and padded portion that represents rents (which historically have been siphoned off to some hundreds 
of billions of dollars).    
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inefficient, are variable and reflect circumstances in the country when it 
becomes a petroState.213 
By all measures, the Nigerian policy makers did not embark on economic plans 
that would have leveraged the windfall from oil and mineral revenues. As illustrated by 
Table 1, the effects of a large influx of foreign currency from the discovery of oil 
reserves led to the diminishing of all other revenue sectors, resulting in the Dutch disease 
phenomenon that continues today in Nigeria.214 The Nigerian economy relies mainly on 
oil and mineral exports. The enduring economic model has centered on exporting raw 
materials and importing manufactured goods. Attempts to industrialize have been limited 
and unsuccessful, primarily due to the willingness of policy makers to stick with the 
status quo. 
Of the research done on the impact of oil on the Nigerian economy, the empirical 
study conducted by Xavier-Sala-i-Martin, professor of economics at Columbia 
University, and Arvind Subramanian, economist at the IMF, perfectly captures the link 
between the nearly exclusive reliance on oil and minerals as the source of economic 
revenue and the abject mismanagement of the revenue, which is the primary cause for a 
dismal institutional development in the country.215 Their research ties the 
mismanagement and theft of revenues to the high poverty levels previously evident in 
Nigeria. Funds that should have reinforced development initiatives and deepened the 
realization of democratic ideals for many Nigerians, to include physical and economic 
security, have instead been siphoned off to a few elites over the last 50 years. The two 
researchers used data covering 1970 to 2000, and published their initial findings in 2003 
and a slightly modified version in 2012. The charts, tables, and graphs in this chapter cite 
heavily from the initial May 2003 publication. The rest of this section cites heavily on 
that research to support the belief echoed by most Nigerians: the root of the endemic 
poverty, lack of services, and a failed and worsening security climate is not the oil and 
minerals but the corrupt tendencies of the people who have comprised the state. 
213 Ibid., 14. 
214 Ross, The Oil Curse, 35–37.  
215 Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Arvind Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An 
Illustration from Nigeria,” Journal of African Economies 22, no. 4 (2012):  573. 
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C. MISMANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES: 1970–2000 
The 30 years between the first coup and the return to democratic rule represent a 
period of astronomical revenue and an equally unprecedented case of economic decline. 
Military and civilian administrations alike proved incapable of managing revenue and 
human capital, which ultimately resulted in the collapse of all non-oil related sectors, the 
collapse of the Nigerian middle class, and high poverty levels. 
1. Revenue 
Revenue allocation and generation has been a persistent political issue in Nigeria. 
The regionalization, then federation of states within the country directly correlates to the 
share of national revenue that each region/state receives. As a concept, regional 
development is tied to the funds. Each state governor or representative is charged with 
enhancing all aspects of social and economic welfare for his or her constituency with 
their allocation of national revenue. Over the years, Nigeria’s revenue has been primarily 
driven by the income from oil and minerals. This has led to disputes ranging from the 
Biafra war to the ongoing destabilizing efforts of MEND in the Niger Delta. One of the 
primary challenges with an extractive-based revenue source like oil is that the control of 
the revenue at the national level is almost absolute. As a result, there is a significant 
discrepancy between the revenue realized at the national level, and the amount that makes 
its way to state and local levels—and by extension, to meet citizens’ needs. 
A key component of the 2003 research is the following statement: 
Over a 35-year period, Nigeria’s revenues from oil (after deducting the 
payments to the foreign oil companies) have amounted to about US$350 
billion at 1995 prices. In 1965, when oil revenues per capita were about 
US$33, per capita GDP was US$245. In 2000, when oil revenues were 
US$325 per capita, per capita GDP remained at the 1965 level. In other 
words, all the oil revenues—US$350 billion in total—did not add to the 




                                                 
Figure 4 offers an illustration of the statement.217 
 
Figure 4.  Revenues from oil, 1965–2000 (at 1995 Prices)218 
With the revenue for that timeframe set, the researchers focused on key indicators 
that affect the average Nigerian citizen, and juxtaposed each indicator with the revenue to 
determine the revenue’s impact and the causes behind the impact. 
2. Poverty 
According to the World Bank and other international poverty indicators, poverty 
rates depicting the number of people surviving on less than US$1 per day ballooned 
during the research time frame—per the authors’ calculations.219 Figures 5 and 6 depict 
the increase both as a percentage of the population and as the number of people who were 
pushed below the poverty line over the same period.220 
217 Ibid.  
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid., 571. 
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 Figure 5.  Poverty rate: 1970–2000 based on 2003 calculations221 
 
Figure 6.  Poverty count: 1970–2000 based on 2003 calculations222 
3. Detrimental Effect of Natural Resources on Institutional Quality and 
Growth 
Institutions are the formal and informal parameters that directly affect the 
citizenry and civil society by modulating relationships. Institutions guide property rights 
and the voracity of rule of law. Formal and functioning institutions that are accessible to 
all citizens provide order to chaos and propagate the sense of equity that mitigates the 
class- or ethnic-based disenfranchisement that often leads to conflict or apathy—both of 
which are endemic in Nigeria. 
221 From Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse,” 571. 
222 From Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse,” 571. 
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Here the authors created specific formulas using the World Bank Development 
Indicator for growth rates of per capita Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) GDP. The authors 
rely on Daniel Kaufmann’s 2002 research to define the institutional components that 
were then measured against natural resources. These components include voice and 
accountability (representation); rule of law (physical security, business and property 
rights, equitable applicability across all demographics); and control of corruption 
(improper use of office or authority—bribery, shadow courts), to name three.223 All are 
subjectively evaluated based on citizen’s perceptions of their government’s abilities and 
performance in each area. (Dani Rodrik et al. also focus on property rights and rule of 
law in their detailed analysis of institutions.)224 After running the growth regression, the 
authors concluded that natural resources have no direct negative impact on growth. The 
regression model used to determine the impact of natural resources on institutional 
quality conclusively determined that natural resources have a significant negative impact 
on the quality of institutions.225 Of greater significance, they found that oil and minerals 
(more than agriculture or other resources) have a higher likelihood of adversely 
impacting institutional quality. Thus, “It is the lobbying for and allocation of the rents 
associated with such resources, which is detrimental to economic and political 
institutions.”226 Additionally, Michael Ross’ arguments on the rents associated with oil 
and minerals support this particular conclusion. 
 
 
223 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, “Governance Matters II—Updated 
Indicators for 2000/01,” World Bank Policy Research Department Working Paper No. 2772 (February 
2002), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15733/multi0page.pdf?sequence=1 
224 Dani Rodrik, Avrind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of 
Institutions over Integration and Geography in Development,” National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper No. 9305, (October 2002), www.nber.org/papers/w9305.pdf.  
225 Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse,” 580. 
226 Ibid., 584. 
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4. Proving Waste and Fraud 
Heavy investment into physical capital (from the oil boom) with an equally rapid 
decline of productivity over the same period leads to the conclusion that the money was 
expensed, but ultimately there is little to show for it. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian’s 
research emphasizes this abuse of finances by comparing two graphics (see Figures 7 and 
8). Figure 7 shows the growth of physical capital: “A substantial part of the increase was 
accounted for by public capital spending financed by surging oil revenues.”227 
 
Figure 7.  GDP, Capital and TFP, 1965–2000 (Index, 1965 = 100)228 
Given the growth of capital investment and spending by the government, a 
parallel trajectory should exist in capacity utilization (Figure 8) that is a measure of 
productivity and should capture the output for the capital investment reflected in Figure 
7. Instead, the data showed an inverse relationship over the same period. 
227 Ibid., 595. 
228 From Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse,” 596.    
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 Figure 8.  Average Capacity Utilization in Manufacturing, 1975–2000 
(percent)229 
Concrete evidence to support such low productivity is evinced by examples such 
as that of the Ajaokuta steel complex that, despite a more than US$20 billion investment 
since it was commissioned in 1979, has yet to produce any steel.230 The caveat to this is 
that average capacity utilization in Nigeria in the decade since 2000 has only slightly 
improved, languishing in the mid-50 percentile range.231 
5. Graphic Depiction of Collapse of Economic Sectors 
The final relevant portion of the Sala-i-Martin study relates to the sharp decline of 
sectors that represented a competitive advantage for Nigeria in the 1960s (cash 
crops/agriculture). Figure 9 shows the juxtaposition of the expansion of government in 
administration and services and depicts the move to civil service and the reliance on the 
government for employment and “payouts or kickbacks.” The previous section clearly 
depicts that government spending did not translate to tangible improvements in other 
sectors. Instead, the government grew as a method of patronage. 
229 From Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse,” 597. Source of 
data is the Central Bank of Nigeria database. 
www.cenbank.org/OUT/2010/PUBLICATIONS/STATISTICALBULLETINS/2009/PartC/PartC.html.  
230 “Nigeria: Completing the Ajaokuta Steel Complex,” The Guardian, 24 September 2014,  
http://allafrica.com/stories/201409240832.html. 
231 Table C.4.1: Average Capacity Utilization, Central Bank of Nigeria, 
www.cenbank.org/OUT/2010/PUBLICATIONS/STATISTICALBULLETINS/2009/PartC/PartC.html. 
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 Figure 9.  Shares of the sectors in real GDP, 1965–2000232 
Viewed through the context of poverty increase over the same time frame, one 
can conclude that significant waste and mismanagement of oil revenues hampered 
Nigeria’s development from 1965 to 2000. The next sections looks at the period since 
2000 and updates some of the metrics covered by the Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian. 
D.  ECONOMIC TRENDS 2000–PRESENT 
By the leading global standards, the decade since the 2003 Sala-i-Martin study 
has been one of impressive growth for the Nigerian economy.233 Some state economies 
within Nigeria, primarily those associated with the All Progressive Congress (APC) 
Party, have slowly but successfully phased in a tax-based revenue system to supplement 
existing oil-based revenue streams. Equally irrefutable is that the “decade of growth” has 
not translated to meaningful advancement in mitigating endemic poverty, improving 
infrastructure to facilitate better economic opportunities, or improving institutions of 
government such as the rule of law and security apparatus that would improve the overall 
standard of living conditions for most Nigerians.234 All that said, the current Nigerian 
economic situation centers around a small but increasing effort to diversify beyond 
232 From Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse,” 601, Figure A. 
233 Jan Hofmeyr, “Africa Rising? Popular Dissatisfaction with Economic Management Despite a 




                                                 
resource based revenues; a struggle to translate positive growth and positive international 
economic indicators into tangible gains at the citizens level; and a sense of desperation as 
Boko Haram–led terrorism is penetrating deeper into all regions of the country, adding 
additional stress that widens the disconnect between the state and citizens. 
1. Current Graphs and Maps 
As Figure 10 shows, crude oil prices have fallen by 50 percent over the last year. 
 
Figure 10.  Depicts the current bust of oil prices235 
The impact of this change has the potential to push more local state governments 
into the tax-based revenue scheme that APC states have been slowly building on. 
 
 
235 From  BBC News Africa Report, “Nigeria elections: Mapping a nation divided,” (8 February 
2015), www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31101351?fb_ref=Default. Oil and gas accounts for 35 percent of 
Nigeria's GDP  and pays for 70 percent of government spending. Petrol products account for 90 percent of 
the country's export earnings. The recent fall in oil prices has forced the government to revise its budget 
and cut growth forecasts. For the first time since 1999, Nigeria's government revenue is shrinking and the 
value of the national currency, the naira, is falling. 
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2. Tax-Based Revenue (Lagos + 5 APC States) 
Necessity has spurred the introduction of tax-based revenue within the southern 
states. Political vindictiveness stemming from the 1999 return to democratic rule led to a 
political map where states with newly elected APC (initially called Action Congress (AC) 
Party) governors had to find supplemental income to accomplish state business—because 
the federally elected president was a member of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). 
Lagos State was one of the APC states and the governor demonstrated strong leadership 
first by using the federally allocated funds to deliver on his campaign promise to improve 
living conditions and governance in Lagos State. The precedent he set by delivering on 
his pledge to the citizens facilitated his efforts to set up a credible and workable tax 
collection system, and thereafter he used the Lagos state radio as an effective community 
mobilization tool to urge the citizenry to pay their taxes to enable the government to 
sustain, improve, and expand on the facilities and amenities. The citizenry have 
responded positively and enthusiastically to the change, and, most promising, other APC 
states have followed suit. Economist Robert Looney describes the situation as follows: 
The reform government initially contracted with a private company to 
collect taxes, offering it a percentage of the gain as incentive. And it 
subsequently cleaned its own house, replacing a compliant bureaucracy 
with one that owed allegiance to the reform governor. As a result, tax 
collections (adjusted for inflation) increased six-fold between 1999 and 
2011. Nearly three-quarters of Lagos’ revenues are now internally 
generated, leading other states to follow its example.236 
This tax-based revenue initiative can be easily seen when depicted on a map that 
shows the APC states, as laid out in Figure 11 from the 8 February 2015 BBC report. 
236 Robert Looney, “Nigeria Faces the Abyss,” (forthcoming article), 7, 
www.relooney.com/NS4053/Rel-Nigeria-Milken-Review-2014.pdf/ 
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 Figure 11.   The 2015 APC states that are in various stages of tax-based revenue 
sourcing237 
Looney rightly points to the unlikeliness of the federal government implementing 
similar schemes due to the general unwillingness to adhere to stricter transparency and 
accountability measures when dealing with tax-based revenue.238 To this point, the 2013 
Afrobarometer survey of citizens’ views on transparency of utilization of tax revenue at 
the federal level reveals that 69 percent of respondents believe the Nigerian governments 
use of tax revenue is “opaque, and very difficult” to track.239 
237 From BBC News, 8 February 2015.  The tax-based schemes have received wide spread support in 
the APC states.  The administration in those states has been able to deliver on improvements to basic 
infrastructure and other public services. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31101351?fb_ref=Default.  
238 Looney, “Nigeria Faces the Abyss,” (forthcoming article), 8, www.relooney.com/NS4053/Rel-
Nigeria-Milken-Review-2014.pdf/ 
239 E. Gyimah-Boadi, Daniel Armah-Attah Mohammed Awal, and Joseph Luna, “Oil and Mining 
Countries: Transparency Low, Impunity High,” 11 December 2013, Policy Brief No. 6., Afrobarometer, 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/policy_brief/ab_r5_policybriefno6.pdf. Figures 1 and 2 are 
in Appendix A and Appendix B. 
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3. Return to Agriculture 
Given the unlikely success of a federal government tax-based revenue approach, 
Looney offers additional insight into other measures taken by the federal government in 
recent years to diversify beyond oil and minerals. He discusses the resurgence of the 
agriculture sector in two relevant articles. Specifically, the government took steps to 
revitalize the agriculture sector by launching the Agriculture Transformation Action Plan 
(ATAP) in 2011.240 Looney cites gradual but steady growth of commercial banking loans 
from a miniscule fraction to almost U.S. $250 million to the sector by 2013, to the 
government’s assertion that 500 thousand jobs have been created over that same time 
frame.241 Both claims support the general consensus that this particular economic policy 
initiative is supported by the citizens and is working to raise overall productivity, with the 
potential in the long-term of reducing poverty and unemployment and Nigeria’s 
overreliance on food imports.242 The prospect of returning to its traditional agricultural 
strengths would allow Nigeria to capitalize on a sector that once represented a 
comparative advantage (extensive labor market and arable lands). 
An assessment of Nigeria’s current economic policies and how those policies 
translate to the citizens ultimately has to consider all the topics previously discussed, 
which encompass historical practices, the role of leadership, the role of international 
actors and indicators of growth, new economic policies, and the citizen’s perspective on 
how it all affects him or her. This final piece is easily overlooked by the federal 
government in Nigeria—due to the reliance on a revenue source that precludes the 
citizen’s input. But as former French president Nicolas Sarkozy states, “Nothing is more 
destructive than the gap between people’s perception of their own day-to-day economic 
well-being and what politicians and statisticians are telling them about the economy.”243 
240 Robert Looney, “Nigeria: Economy,” Europa World Plus online, (London: Routledge), retrieved 
13 February 2015 from //www.europaworld.com/entry/ng.ec.  
241 Ibid., 3; Looney, “Nigeria faces abyss,” 7. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Robert Looney, “The Boko Haram Economy,” Foreign Policy (July 15, 2014), 2, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/15/the-boko-haram-economy/. 
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This statement speaks directly to the disconnect between Nigeria’s “decade of growth” 
and that growth not translating to real gains for the average Nigerian citizen. In spite of 
factoring in industries such as the highly successful Nollywood (Nigerian film industry), 
the fashion industry, telecoms, and other service and manufacturing gains that boosted 
the overall GDP, “Nigerians are no richer than they were before the GDP figures were 
revised.”244  
Equally disturbing is the growing threat represented by Boko Haram to these 
diversification efforts. As reflected in Appendix A, the BBC report offers insight into the 
expanding efforts by the terrorist organization as it takes aim at destabilizing more 
regions across the country, destroying the already fragile infrastructure and instilling fear 
into citizens and foreign investors alike—who are less likely to pursue loans to start 
businesses or make impactful investment partnerships, respectively, due to the volatile 
security environment.245 Looney cites Nigeria’s ranking of 122nd out of 126 countries on 
the 2013 Positive Peace Index as a deterrent for foreign investors.246 Finally, the federal 
government’s slow response to the destabilizing threat of Boko Haram has further 
exploited the disenfranchisement rooted in religious, ethnic, and regional politics. The 
government inaction reinforces that despite the democratic title and visage, it is a closed 
administration that is less obligated to act when prompted by citizens and civil society 
alone. 
E. IMPACT OF BAD ECONOMIC POLICIES ON THE CITIZEN 
The social factors in Nigeria, measured by matrices collected from the UNDP 
HDI, the Afrobarometer, and others, clearly indicate that despite economic growth 
depicted in the GDP and other international economic measures, the plight of the citizen 
vis-à-vis services and security has stagnated or worsened. 
244 Ibid. 
245 See Appendix A for maps depicting growing attacks. 
246 Looney, “The Boko Haram Economy,” 2. 
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1. Afrobarometer Perceptions on the Economy and Personal Living 
Conditions 
In 2008, Afrobarometer published its findings from a “comparative series of 
national public attitude surveys on democracy, markets and civil society in Africa.”247 
The nine-part compendium offers an insight into citizens’ assessment of their reality in 
their own country. It is a counterbalance to a lot of the progress that the empirical data in 
earlier sections of this chapter alludes to. The importance of the citizen’s opinion is aptly 
captured by the authors’ statement: “Perceptions are paramount in the interest-driven 
realm of the marketplace and the ideological realm of politics. Whether or not attitudes 
exactly mirror exterior circumstances, an individual’s interior perspective forms the basis 
of any calculus of action.”248 Specific to Nigeria, the representative sample size of 2,324 
adults (over age 18 and voter eligible) was conducted from 13 to 25 May, 2008.249 
Two parts specifically deal with the citizen’s perception of the economic situation 
in Nigeria and how it directly affects them. With regard to national economic conditions, 
61 percent of respondents felt that Nigeria’s economic condition was “fairly/very bad.” 
An additional 4 percent felt that the current year was either the same or much worse than 
the previous year, and 75 percent predicted an even worse economic situation in the 
following year.250 When asked about their personal economic conditions, more than half 
the respondents had less than favorable opinions on their present living conditions—with 
32 percent responding “fairly/very bad.” This particular opinion was tempered by over 80 
percent having a more positive outlook for living conditions in the following year.251 
The perceived economic woes continued in 2013 despite a decade of growth—per 
World Bank indicators. In a follow-up survey by Afrobarometer, 67 percent of 
247 Eric Little and Carolyn Logan, Afrobarometer Network, “The quality of democracy and 
governance in Africa: New Results from Afrobarometer Round 4: A Compendium of Public Opinion 
Findings from 19 African Countries, 2008,” Working Paper No. 108. www.afrobarometer.org.  
248 Ibid., 4. 
249 Ibid., 3. 
250 Ibid., 35. 
251 Ibid., 36. 
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respondents in Nigeria felt that the national economy was either bad or very bad.252 
Similarly, 42 percent of respondents felt that their personal living conditions were fairly 
to very bad in 2013—10 additional percentage points worse than 2008. And much like 
2008, 85 percent had a positive outlook for improvements in the following year.253 
In ranking the top three problems in Nigeria, respondents picked economic, 
agricultural, and then social issues and services as first, second and third. At 59 percent, 
improving economic conditions superseded maintaining order, protecting rights, and 
improving political checks and balances.254 Specifically, the central government received 
dismal ratings in its handling of economic matters ranging from improving living 
standards, ensuring people have enough to eat, creating jobs, and maintaining roads and 
bridges (critical to commerce) to narrowing gaps between the wealthy and poor, keeping 
prices down, and fighting corruption. The high inflation rate due to economic policies 
contributed to high prices rating the worst with 81 percent of respondents saying that the 
government performance was very bad.255 The round of questions about the central 
government’s performance on services such as providing water and sanitation services, 
providing reliable electricity supply, and protecting rivers and forests all equally had low 
ratings, with 75 percent reporting fairly to very bad provision of reliable electricity—
which is critical to all aspects of life.256 
A 2013 basic services performance ratings survey conducted by Afrobarometer 
provides insight into the continued downward spiral of water and sanitation (71 percent) 
and electrical (79 percent) services in Nigeria. In both cases, the 2013 assessment was 
worse than that in 2008. Drilling further down to the local government levels, 
respondents seemed to have a slightly better opinion of performance on parallel matters. 
Maintaining local roads, maintaining marketplaces, removing refuse, and protecting local 
252 Jan Hofmeyr, “Africa Rising? Popular Dissatisfaction with economic management despite a 
decade of Growth,” Afrobarometer Policy Brief No. 2, (October 2013): 13. 
www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/policy_brief/ab_r5_policybriefno2.pdf 
253 Ibid., 17. 
254 Little and Logan, Working Paper No. 108, 19. 
255 Ibid., 21. 
256 Ibid., 22. 
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community assets all had better responses with only a low 60th percentile responding as 
being fairly or very badly handled by local governments.257 
2. Inequality and Poverty 
In chronicling some local poverty metrics in Nigeria, the 2008 survey shows that 
too many Nigerians went without enough food to eat, clean water for use in the home, 
fuel to cook, and cash income. Additionally, the survey found that 75 percent of 
respondents felt that the economic policies benefited only an elite few. The 2013 update 
reinforces these views on inequality with 84 percent stating that the government does a 
fairly or very bad job of creating jobs and 88 percent of respondents saying that the 
government does a fairly or very bad job of reducing the gap between the rich and poor in 
Nigeria.258 
3. Human Development Index and Inequality 
The HDI is a widely accepted composite index that looks beyond economic 
growth to evaluate the basic development levels of 187 countries.259 Specifically, HDI 
“is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human 
development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard 
of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three 
dimensions.”260 There is an illusion of progress when one looks at the raw data 
concerning Nigeria compiled over a range of years by the UNDP, which is reflected in 
Table 3. 
257 Ibid., 23. 
258Hofmeyr, Policy Brief No.2, 18.  
258Hofmeyr, Policy Brief No.2, 18.  
259 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports, Human Development 
Index, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi.  
260 Ibid. 
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GNI per capita 
(2011 PPP$) 
HDI value 
1980 45.6 6.7  4,259  
1985 46.4 8.6  3,202  
1990 46.1 6.7  2,668  
1995 46.1 7.2  2,594  
2000 46.6 8.0  2,711  
2005 48.7 9.0 5.0 3,830 0.466 
2010 51.3 9.0 5.2 4,716 0.492 
2011 51.7 9.0 5.2 4,949 0.496 
2012 52.1 9.0 5.2 5,176 0.500 
2013 52.5 9.0 5.2 5,353 0.504 
 
261 From 2014 Nigeria HDR: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NGA.pdf. 
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Focusing specifically from 2005 to 2013 in the 2014 Human Development Report (HDR) 
on Nigeria, the composite index is deconstructed to show the trend of each component. 
As depicted in Figure 12, the trend for the indices over the nine-year period generally 
seems positive. As is discussed below, both Table 3 and Figure 12 depict a promising 
picture of reality. Figure 12 shows the contribution of each component index to Nigeria’s 
HDI since 2005. 
 
Figure 12.  Trends in Nigeria’s HDI component indices 2005–2013262 
In 2010, the UNDP started factoring in the extensive inequalities seen across 
many countries despite the economic growth that the same countries were experiencing. 
UNDP developed the inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) to capture the inequality inherent 
in each country and present a rebased HDI that accounts for that inequality. Of the IHDI, 
the UNDP states: 
262 From 2014 Nigeria HDR: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NGA.pdf.  
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The IHDI is basically the HDI discounted for inequalities. The “loss” in 
human development due to inequality is given by the difference between 
the HDI and the IHDI, and can be expressed as a percentage. As the 
inequality in a country increases, the loss in human development also 
increases. We also present the coefficient of human inequality as a direct 
measure of inequality which is an unweighted average of inequalities in 
three dimensions.263 
To illustrate, the 2014 HDR computes the adjusted IHDI (the HDI discounted for 
inequality) for Nigeria as follows: The HDI for 2013 is 0.504. However, the IHDI is 
0.300, a loss of 40.3 percent due to inequality in the distribution of the dimension indices, 
as reflected in Table 4. The average loss due to inequality for low HDI countries is 32.6 
percent and for sub-Saharan Africa, it is 33.6 percent. The human inequality coefficient 
for Nigeria is equal to 40.2 percent. 


















Nigeria 0.300 40.3 40.2 40.8 45.2 34.5 
 
The IHDI essentially tempers the propensity to automatically project progress 
reflected in a growing GDP and GNI to improvements in the lives of the average 
Nigerian. Instead, the 0.300 value portrays a more dismal and accurate picture of 






264 After “Table C: Nigeria’s IHDI for 2013 relative to selected countries and groups” 
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The low level of development also validates the results of MPI that were first 
computed in the 2010 HDR.265 The computations for 2011 are reflected in Table 5 of the 
2014 HDR report and show a country where 68.0 percent of the population lives below 
the income poverty line of U.S. $1.25 per day, with 25.7 percent of those in severe 
poverty. The IHDI statistics are commensurate with the Afrobarometer findings 
regarding hardships related to challenging living standards faced by many Nigerians. 
 
 
265 As stated by UNDP: “The MPI identifies multiple deprivations in the same households in 
education, health and living standards. The education and health dimensions are each based on two 
indicators, while the standard of living dimension is based on six indicators. All of the indicators needed to 
construct the MPI for a household are taken from the same household survey. The indicators are weighted 
to create a deprivation score, and the deprivation scores are computed for each household in the survey. A 
deprivation score of 33.3 percent (one-third of the weighted indicators), is used to distinguish between the 
poor and nonpoor. If the household deprivation score is 33.3 percent or greater, the household (and 
everyone in it) is classed as multidimensionally poor. Households with a deprivation score greater than or 
equal to 20 percent but less than 33.3 percent are near multidimensional poverty. Definitions of 
deprivations in each dimension, as well as methodology of the MPI are given in Technical note 5 and in 
Calderon and Kovacevic 2014.” Definition found in the 2014 Nigeria HDR: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NGA.pdf. 
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Table 5.   Most recent MPI for Nigeria266 
 
     Population share (%) 
Contribution to overall poverty of 






















Nigeria 2011 0.239 43.3 55.2 17.0 25.7 68.0 32.6 26.9 40.4 
 
266 From Table “F” of 2014 HDR http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/NGA.pdf. 
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F. IMPACT ON CIVIL SOCIETY 
In articulating what civil society is, Leslie Fox states, “Civil society is a political 
concept because it is essentially about power; the power of non-state actors to participate 
in making decisions that have an impact on them.”267 By this definition, civil society has 
not realized many victories or gains in Nigeria. Victories in areas related to women’s 
health issues and AIDS have been pushed and funded by international NGOs, and local 
extensions of those NGOs have leveraged the international visibility to maintain some of 
those gains. Nigeria’s civil society has had limited confrontational or complementary 
efforts with the Nigerian government in recent years. Admittedly, Goran Hyden describes 
the most fundamental challenge that CSOs face: 
Civil society presupposes the existence of a public realm in which there is 
a clear delineation of rights and obligations between individual citizens 
and the State. There needs to be a legal and constitutional framework 
which applies equally to everyone. A society lacks in civility if some 
members believe they stand above  the law. In States where this is the 
case the rule of law is in question. In these countries, the task of building 
civil society cannot be seen in isolation from building the State. If the 
latter lacks what Max Weber refers to as a “legal-rational” foundation for 
its authority, building civil society is bound to run into special problems. 
This is the challenge particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.268 
By extension, the same applies to Nigeria. Internal organizational inefficiencies 
are exacerbated by external institutional inefficiencies, such as weak rule of law and 
weak CSO funding. All these issues frustrate the ability of CSOs to realize the political 
impact that Fox describes. 
Nigerian CSOs face several funding constraints ranging from setting up and 
maintaining advocacy groups for building and sustaining the momentum behind 
initiatives to the cost associated with maintaining a reliable communication infrastructure 
in a country with unreliable power sources. This problem is further exacerbated when 
267 Goran Hyden, “Building Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium,” in Beyond Prince and 
Merchant: Citizen Participation and the Rise of Civil Society, ed. John Burbidge, (New York: Pact 
Publications, 1997), 17.  
268 Ibid., 39. 
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ethnic and religious tensions are factored in. When regional economic and social 
development is added to this mix, the associated funding becomes politicized and is no 
longer a nationalist struggle for CSOs, who, as they solicit funding for these expenses, 
must then also contend with regional alliances and interests. Janice Jiggins describes 
these frustrations in detail when writing on the successes and challenges of advocating 
for women’s health in Nigeria since the 1980s.269 
Marina Ottaway notes the same constraints in her analysis of civil society in Third 
World countries. She frames her points by observing that the donor-heavy effort of 
cultivating civil society in these countries has thus far led to a donor-driven definition of 
CSOs and donor-driven areas of focus since it is the donor that controls the purse 
strings—regardless of what issues the average citizen may actually be interested in 
advancing. Ottaway concludes that the foreign nature of funding has hindered the strong 
connection with grassroots or citizens.270 Ottaway describes a dilemma faced by foreign 
donors: to support trustee entities that they can control but that have a shallow connection 
with the grassroots or to put their funding toward grassroots associations and 
professionalize them in a manner that fosters their ability to balance foreign funding with 
local interests.271 The success of either approach is summarily panned by Dambisa 
Moyo, who cites numerous studies in concluding that civil society requires a middle class 
with an interest in holding its government accountable and foreign aid funding hinders 
the government’s interest in developing a middle class—often it chooses not to institute 
economic policies that would foster enough independence and elevate the middle class to 
one with the potential of challenging the government.272 Moyo’s point on the strength of 
mobilization and influence a tax-paying middle class has speaks directly to what is 
missing in Nigeria. Finally, she links it all together, pointing out that the most critical 
269 Janice Jiggins, “Women Remaking Civil Society,” in Beyond Prince and Merchant, ed. John 
Burbidge (New York: Pact Publications, 1997), 207–214. 
270 Marina Ottaway, “Social Movements, Professionalization of Reform, and Democracy in Africa,” 
in Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion, eds. Marina Ottaway and Thomas 
Carothers, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press), 78. 
271 Ibid., 85. 
272 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa 
(New York:  Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009), 57.en58. 
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component of strong, effective, and efficient civil society is a strong middle class with 
interests to hold government accountable to.273 
While Moyo raises credible points on the influence of foreign aid, an area with 
very little research so far is the nature of Nigerian federal funding of CSOs. In the very 
few cases where federal funding occurs, the CSO seems to be an extension of the federal 
or state patronage system. Recent effort is being made by CSOs that are funded by the 
government to separate their stance from one that is merely an extension of the federal 
source of funding so they can advocate on behalf of the masses. This change is evinced 
first by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN), who recently 
established a Whistleblower Protection Fund to protect members and the public from 
litigation expenses related to possible reprisals from the government.274 The efforts by a 
coalition of 10 CSOs under the umbrella of the State of the Union (SOTU) and in 
collaboration with Accountability for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health in Nigeria 
(AMHiN) represents the second example. These CSOs, along with the Nigeria Labor 
Congress (NLC) and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) joined efforts to pressure 
President Jonathan’s administration to follow through on its financial pledge to spend 
approximately US$ 10 million of national funds toward combating the Ebola virus. This 
collaboration stemmed from back-pedaling by the minister of health on the use of the 
funds that were pledged when the president declared a state of emergency on Ebola. As 
of the end of 2014, this was still an ongoing battle of interests.275 
G. CONCLUSION 
For oil-based economies such as Nigeria, phenomena such as the Dutch disease 
and the resource curse are fairly common conditions because the core economic model 
273 Ibid. 
274 Andy Nssien, “Nigeria: ICAN Sets Up N50 Million Whistleblowers’ Protection Fund,” 12 
December 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201412121443.html.  
275 Sylvester Enoghase and Hassan Zaggi, “Nigeria: CSOs Battle Jonathan Over Assent to National 
Health Bill,” Daily Independent, 30 November 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201411300176.html. 
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for the country is centered on resource extraction and sale. Terms such as these matter 
because they are the most significant barrier to the citizen and, by extension, civil society 
development. The bottom line is that the federal administration in Nigeria is a closed 
state—a trait it shares with many oil-based economies around the world. Is this a 
common fate for all resource-rich developing economies? The answer seems to be no 
when discussing the global population of countries but yesfor Nigeria and African 
countries. Extensive research conducted and published by entities ranging from Global 
Governance to independent researchers suggest that a number of factors can mitigate the 
likelihood for the Dutch disease in these economies. Those factors include the nature of 
the leadership, the diversification of revenue sourcing, and the strengthening of the 
middle class. 
The IMF, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), and other 
prominent international agencies set an 8 percent (of total GDP) threshold to categorize 
countries that are supported by extractive minerals. Nigeria is in a league with numerous 
other African countries where a high percentage of GDP is attributable to extractive 
minerals.276 Apart from petroleum, Nigeria’s other natural resources include natural gas, 
tin, iron ore, coal, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc, and arable land. The oil and gas sector 
accounts for about 35 per cent of GDP, and petroleum exports revenue represents over 90 
percent of total exports revenue.277 Commodities are subject to the bust and boom of the 
market and, as such, represent a precarious foundation upon which to base revenue 
source for any nation’s development. 
Even more concerning is the high possibility of mismanagement of the rents 
associated with commodity-based revenue. Commodities can be a vital part of revenue 
but should be a component of a diverse program. To foster vertical accountability in all 
aspects of government and society, citizens have to be connected to their elected 
leadership. In turn, the leadership is obligated to make sound economic and policy 
decisions that are in the best interest of those they represent. Tax-based revenue is the 
276 Gyimah-Boadi et al. “Oil and Mining Countries.” 
277 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm. 
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main economic vehicle to engender such a relationship. The state is open, civil 
associations are emboldened by and enabled to advocate on behalf of citizens, and 
citizens are empowered to exercise their constitutional rights and recall or elect officials 
at all levels of government who will create policies and results that are beneficial to the 
security and living conditions of the majority, rather than to an elite few. 
The economic history of Nigeria supports a track record of disconnect within the 
civilian population. Influence is restricted to foreign investment sources and oligarchs 
that have materialized since the introduction of some liberalization initiative by Gowon in 
the early 1970s. Endemic corruption leads to a state with a closed economy. These factors 
have limited and continue to limit the ability of civil society to have meaningful impact in 
advocating for the interests of citizens. The bottom line is that the state has to be willing 




This thesis examined three reasons why civil society is handicapped in its ability 
to promote democratic governance in Nigeria. The argument attributes this failure to a 
disconnect between the essential components of democratic governance: the civil society 
(comprising the masses and the elites that represent the CSO administrative structure), 
the state, and the economy. 
First, this thesis posits that traditional/tribal civil society weakened as a 
consequence of modernization. However, the new civil society has yet to connect with 
the state in order to produce effective representative governance. The systematic 
weakening and cooptation of the traditional institutions that attended to the security and 
service needs of citizens was reduced for several reasons. The proliferation of Western 
religion and education through Christian missionaries broke the bonds to traditional 
practices and introduced new beliefs and concepts of success. These new concepts led to 
the migration of many from rural to urban areas in pursuit of new ideals. Chinua Achebe 
and other noted authors have charted the effects of Western influence on traditional 
institutions in Nigeria. Eventually, new “Nigerian” administrations (military and civilian 
alike), also undermined the traditional institutions by force or other means. The new 
administrations felt the need to either neutralize the power and influence of traditional 
institutions, or they used them to legitimize their own authority and relevance with the 
“old” ways. As a result, traditional institutions are now relegated to ceremonial and 
cultural heritage roles. 
The second reason for the disconnection relates to the lack of trust among the 
three essential components already mentioned. The disappointment related to promises 
that were not kept has fed a cycle of distrust between the masses, the elites that run 
CSOs, and the state. Additionally, high levels of corruption by individuals and all levels 
of government proved devastating for building the trust or social capital needed to 
promote cooperation between individuals and groups. 
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The third reason for the disconnection is the oil- and mineral-based economic 
model that essentially renders the citizen irrelevant to the state for revenue—leading to a 
closed state. Since the government does not operate on tax-based revenue, it has not been 
and is not obligated to the citizens. The evidence of this critical disconnect is in the lack 
of development and the corresponding low performance ratings that Nigerian citizens 
have given the state. As a result of these three factors—weak traditional institutions, 
distrust, and an ineffective economic model—there is a disconnect between the citizen 
and the citizen’s role as it relates to attaining vertical accountability (individually or 
through the civil society vehicle). The disconnect renders civil society ineffective. 
Despite the suppositions by extant literature that civil society may not be applicable to 
non-Western societies such as Nigeria, the evidence suggests that it is. The depth of CSO 
impact is, however, a valid topic of contention. Notwithstanding, the fact remains that 
Nigerian societies have well-documented traditional practices of communal interaction 
and social obligation that predate the modern civil society paradigm. 
A. INDIA IN COMPARISON 
India is in the echelon of nations that are not geographically west, but subscribe to 
Western ideals of democracy, liberty, and capitalism—led by a secular state. India offers 
a good case for comparison because of the similarities it shares with Nigeria. Those 
similarities make it especially relevant in trying to ascertain the divergence in approaches 
to civil society in both countries. In advocating for strategic alliances between Nigeria 
and India, risk analyst Ronak Gopaldas states the most obvious similarity: both countries 
are parliamentary democracies with a federal system of government where states have 
autonomy in governance.278 The significance of this contemporary similarity reverberates 
through every aspect of social and political fabric in both countries. A state has more 
autonomy when revenue is tax based. The autonomy affects the federal and state 
governments’ propensity to work with CSOs and the masses. When funding is top down, 
it skews the relationship in favor of the federal government. 
278 Ronak Gopaldas, “Why Nigeria and India Would Make Excellent Bedfellows,” Business Day, 
www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2013/05/24/why-nigeria-and-india-would-make-excellent-bedfellows. 
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In India, civil society and the state have a history of working together. The 
evolution of civil society in India is steeped in a symbiotic approach to development. 
Civil society evolved from the concept that the state has the revenue, capacity, and 
responsibility to guarantee that individual rights are equitably realized by Indians of all 
ethnic and religious factions and that civil society is a partner in helping the state achieve 
that goal in a manner that respects the rights of citizens—a la Hegel and Locke. To that 
end, the panchayat (traditional self-rule institutions) and local governments leverage one 
another’s influence to advance the needs of the masses. Passed in 1992, the 73rd and the 
74th constitutional amendments, 
declared the three-tier panchayat raj institutions and municipalities as 
institutions of  self-government, implying their rights to be treated as 
autonomous institutions. The  amendments also made mandatory 
provisions to hold regular elections to these bodies  and gave direction to 
the state legislatures to devolve powers and responsibility to them,  so that 
they could discharge certain local level government functions in respect of 
development in an autonomous manner.”279 
More than 20 years later, there remains an active debate about whether the formal 
incorporation of the panchayat structure has benefited civil society in India. Regardless, 
bottom-up participation in India is a success story as it relates to development and 
advocating for the rights of the masses. 
Ultimately the relationship and attitude toward civil society is fostered by three 
factors in India: First, panchayat and local governments have an extended history of trust 
and support of each one’s efforts, to the point where local government politicians 
advocate for the land rights management by panchayats (where applicable). Granted, 
there are enough exceptions to the rule to believe that this long-standing relationship is 
becoming more tenuous and could erode to the point of irrelevance if steps are not taken 
to foster the relationship. Second, the problematic trust triad in Nigeria between the 
masses, the state, and the CSO management exists to a lesser degree in India. Again, 
recent pressures associated with the proliferation of CSOs and the changing dynamics of 
CSOs in India suggests that this relationship may be strained. Third, and most 
279 D. Bandyopadhyay, Saila K. Ghosh, and Buddhadeb Ghosh, “Dependency versus Autonomy: 
Identity Crisis of India’s Panchayats,” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no. 38 (September, 2003): 3987. 
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importantly, the economic model employed in India is vastly different than that of 
Nigeria. India has a diversified economic base. Revenue comes from natural resources, 
manufacturing, use of the high labor market, and the software technology sector, and, 
most importantly, India has an electronic tax-based revenue sourcing capability.280 
1. Traditional Institutions, the State and Civil Society 
Writing about state-civil society relationship in modern India at the end of the 
20th century going into the 21st century, Gurpeet Mahajan draws the essential link that 
India must maintain to maximize the potential of each component and secure the 
equitable rights and liberties of its citizenry. Citing John Keane, she states, 
Universal laws cannot emerge spontaneously from civil society; their 
formulation and application entails the involvement of the state...As such, 
it is difficult to detach civil society from the state or to conceive it without 
the latter. Indeed the institutions of civil society are, and must be viewed 
as, parts of the democratic constitutional state.281 
What makes her comments more relevant is that they are a critique of the skewed 
pendulum swing at the end of the 20th century that placed more emphasis on CSOs 
outside the realm of the state. The years leading up to her statement had seen the 
burgeoning role of panchayats in fostering participation at the lowest levels as a counter 
to the Indian government’s market efficiency and national security agenda. The state’s 
focus was elsewhere and not necessarily on development282—a gap that panchayats 
championed quite effectively. Mahajan’s observation was to temper this growing divide 
between the “mass politics”—represented by panchayats, and the state. She cautions 
against this separation and advocates that the strength of both traditional institutions and 
the state is essential for a representative democracy.283 
280 “Paying Taxes 2014: The global picture. A Comparison of Tax Systems in 189 Economies World-
Wide,” PWC, www.pwc.com/gx/en/paying-taxes/assets/pwc-paying-taxes-2014.pdf. 
281 Gurpreet Mahajan, “Civil Society and Its Avtars: What Happened to Freedom and Democracy?” 
Economic and Political Weekly, May 15, 1999, 1195–1196. 
282 Ibid., 1193. 
283 Ibid., 1194. 
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While Mahajan emphasizes the state’s role in the equation, Indrajit Roy 
champions the bottom-up approach for a representative democracy, a “demand-driven” 
decentralized approach that drives Indian society. Roy believes that the 73rd Constitution 
merely codified a strong self-governing history that had evolved from precolonial times 
in India. The formal state government physically lacks the sheer capacity to manage such 
a diverse population and as such, “micro-community” participation to address these 
issues of development is essential to the Indian society.284 Grassroots organizations in 
India tend to proliferate at the rural level—in the villages where the needs arise. This 
physical presence facilitates their relevance and impact to the citizens and the 
government structure. An example is the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in 
the north Indian state of Rajasthan who were able to successfully mobilize rural 
participation by pushing the right-to-information act from the lowest level to the state 
level in a long-term anticorruption initiative. The goal was to gain insight into the state’s 
minimum wage and food subsidies program, which was adversely impacting the local 
community.285 Proximity to the masses facilitated MKSS’ ability to get buy-in from 
elites, intellectuals, activists, the media, the poor, women, and all other affected 
groups.286 The initiative was successful in gaining the access to government-held 
information that is critical to all aspects of governance—in this case “the notion that 
citizens have a right both to know how they are governed and to participate actively in 
the process of auditing their representative.”287 In light of the rural embedment of these 
participatory organizations in India, the urban persuasion of similar organizations in 
Nigeria is a stark contrast and a possible factor that limits the Nigerian organizations’ 
ability to foster the connection required to mobilize the masses. Nigerian civil society has 
a more top-down structure than a bottom-up configuration. The potential exists for true 
mobilization if civil society in Nigeria can adopt this decentralized paradigm. 
284 Indrajit Roy, “Development and its Discontents: Civil Society as the new lexicon,” Society for 
International Development 46, no. 1 (2003): 83–84. 
285 Rob Jenkins and Anne Marie Goetz, “Accounts and Accountability: Theoretical Implications of the 
Right –to-Information Movement in India,” Third World Quarterly 20, no. 3 (1999): 604.  
286 Ibid., 619. 
287 Ibid., 603. 
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2. Trust and Social Capital in India and Nigeria 
As discussed earlier, the role of CSOs in India has historically been to promote 
participatory governance and democracy. The success that CSOs have had in advocacy 
has led to implementation of acts such as “Right to Information, Rural Employment 
Guarantee, and Domestic Violence.”288 Additionally, the close working relationship 
between CSOs and local governance structures such as the Panchayat Raj Institutions 
continue to reinforce trust. Issues that are important to the masses have translated into 
legislative action, and all levels of government want to show they are open to the 
partnership. 
Ashutosh Varshney discusses the emphasis that Mahatma Gandhi and others 
placed on advocating for lowest-level associational networks that were built across ethnic 
boundaries specifically to mitigate polarization of communities.289 Gandhi’s efforts 
started in the 1920s and were aimed at preparing a multiethnic, multireligious Indian 
society to work together on issues that remain relevant in contemporary Indian society. 
Recognizing the essential need to build trust between individuals and different ethnic and 
religious communities, Gandhi’s efforts focused on building intercommunal associations 
that would not only “do a better job of withstanding exogenous communal shock—like 
the partition in 1947, or the desecration of holy places [Babri mosque in December 
1992]; they also constrain local politicians in their strategic behavior,” especially as it 
relates to political electoral objectives.290 This early drive to engender trust beyond 
members of the same religion, ethnic, or immediate relationship metric speaks directly to 
Francis Fukuyama’s discussions on social capital.291 It also stands in contrast to the 
regional, religious, and ethnic divisions used in the critical period in Nigeria when new 
associations and CSOs were being created. The Nigerian equivalent was intra-communal 
in nature, and the ramifications from that are still evident in contemporary issues. 
288 Debika Goswami, Rajesh Tandon, and Kaustuv K. Bandyopadhyay, “Civil Society in Changing 
India: Emerging Roles, Relationships and Strategies,” Society for Participatory Research in Asia, (2012): 
6, www.c2d2.ca/sites/default/files/Civil%20Society%20Study%20Report_India.pdf. 
289 Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society,” 364.  
290 Ibid, 375–377. 
291 Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development,” 7 
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3. INDIA (Economy, Civil Society and Masses) 
A number of economic factors have facilitated cooperation between the three 
component stakeholders in India. Beyond the constitutional recognition of traditional 
self-rule institutions, the Indian government also recognizes the role CSOs and NGOs 
play in service delivery of public health, education, and environmental development in its 
five-year plans.292 The recognition by the state came with an increased financial 
responsibility by the state to fund CSO and NGO activities. India embarked on a series of 
economic reforms in the 1990s that led to 6–8 percent growth rates over the last 
decade.293 The country diversified its economy in last 25 years. The 2012 Participatory 
Research in Asia (PRIA) report also notes the following economic facts as areas of Indian 
economic diversification: advances in information technology, manufacturing, and 
innovations and growth in PPP that is projected to be third behind China and the United 
States by 2025. India also has a developed formal tax system where more than 35 percent 
of the people pay income taxes with growing pressure to increase that number.294 The 
Indian economy is diversified and at least partially obligated to some form of 
accountability vis-à-vis the tax-paying (individuals and businesses) constituents. This 
simple fact is game changer for mass mobilization, transparency, and accountability 
initiatives. The state has more pressure to respond to these citizen-driven requests. 
With respect to civil society interests and funding, as the Indian economy 
matured, there has been a corresponding decrease in the amount of ODA and 
international aid—meaning that the state and civil society were forced to work even 
closer together to achieve the interests of the masses.295 In many respects, the state is the 
funder and regulator of CSOs.296 It is in this capacity as regulator that CSOs and NGOs 
292 Maya Unnithan and Carolyn Heitmeyer, “Global Rights and State Activism: Reflections on Civil 
Society—State Partnerships in Health in NW India,” Contributions to Indian Sociology 46, no. 3 (2012): 
289. 
293 Debika Goswami, Rajesh Tandon, and Kaustuv K. Bandyopadhyay, “Civil Society in Changing 
India: Emerging Roles, Relationships and Strategies,” Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), 
(2012): 2, www.c2d2.ca/sites/default/files/Civil%20Society%20Study%20Report_India.pdf. 
294 “Paying Taxes 2014,” 76. 
295  PRIA, 10. 
296 PRIA, 10. 
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in India face a precarious future. While the state is obligated to engage society in the 
expenditure of funds, the economic boom in India has led to recent actions by the Indian 
government to drop foreign funding of CSOs and to withdraw from receiving the aid of 
numerous other bilateral donors.297 These funding changes are forcing many CSOs away 
from advocacy issues to strictly service delivery and government program executor 
capacity.298 
By contrast, in Nigeria, the lack of transparency in Nigeria’s budget remains a 
handicap for CSOs. The lack of structured and reliable government funds and the limited 
research available on such funding makes it hard to evaluate which source of funding 
(national or foreign) has the most impact on development. One can argue that the ethical 
pitfalls that are sometimes associated with international funding make this the lesser 
choice. As laid out by Moyo, those pitfalls include the tendency for donor nations to 
mandate requirements that have long-term detrimental effects to the citizens; the 
tendency for the receiving nation to coopt the funds into the corrupt cycle as argued; the 
tendency for receiving nations to retard all national efforts to develop the skills or tools to 
perform the service requirement themselves; and the tendency for local branches of 
internationally driven CSOs to have a stronger fidelity to the international entity vice the 
citizens they aim to serve. Despite all of these factors, the fact that an established need is 
consistently addressed with a reliable presence (organizational representatives and 
funding), is better than a potentially disjointed and unreliable national response. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The colonial histories of both countries cannot be viewed in isolation from their 
current circumstances. Past colonial influence still has an impact on the contemporary 
governments in each country. Specifically, the ramifications of colonial practices 
continue to have long-term effects on current governance structures. Nigeria, more than 
India, is struggling to navigate a political and social quagmire that existed at 
independence and continues till today. In Nigeria, the colonial impact can still be seen in 
297 Ibid., 17. 
298 Ibid., 18–20. 
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resource rights that favor British and Western companies and through mandated SAPs 
that decimated a fledgling middle class in the 1980s, and they continue now through 
resource rites that still favor a manufactured-goods import-reliant economic model in 
Nigeria. This is not an attempt to absolve contemporary Nigerian administrations of their 
obligations to democratic governance as understood by the masses, but the handicap does 
exist and needs to be acknowledged. 
Handicap aside, the Nigerian state continues to squander opportunities that may 
be precariously close to terminating. The states’ inability to channel more than five 
decades of revenue into meaningful infrastructure development (power grid, 
communications, transportation) that would further propel the economy and foster 
investment is inexcusable—especially when juxtaposed against the massive amounts of 
personal wealth that a very limited elite have accumulated. As long as Nigeria remains 
reliant on oil and a revenue source that does not rely on the taxes or labor or human 
capacity of the masses, the state will always be predisposed to decisions that only benefit 
the elite. There will never be a reason to open up dialogue with civil society or any entity 
that advocates for the masses. 
Ironically, civil society has an opportunity to capitalize on a dynamic political and 
social climate that exists in Nigeria right now. The transformation that results when the 
masses are connected and mobilized could occur if the tax-based system continues to 
spread to more Nigerian states. A formal tax-based revenue structure has the potential to 
increase lowest-level vertical accountability action and mobilize the masses in a way that 
strengthens civil society and forces the state to the respond. 
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Civilian rule was established in Nigeria in 1999, after 30years of military dictatorship. 
The budget system requires fundamental reform in order to bring about real transparency 
and accountability. 
 
Legal framework for transparency 
Nigeria does not have a fiscal transparency code or a budget law specifying roles for 
ministries and other stakeholders in the drafting of the budget. Existing laws and 
regulations include provisions that are contradictory and ambiguous. 
 
The Constitution provides for parliamentary approval of the annual budget. However, it is 
vague in many respects. For example, the Constitution does not specifically require 
parliamentary approval for annual revenue estimates or the financial plan of government. 
 
The legal framework does not provide any clarity on the extent of legislative powers, for 
example its powers to amend the budget. 
 
There is no law that specifies the budget format, what documents are to accompany the 
budget or how and when budget information is to be disseminated. Similarly, there is no 
requirement to release information on actual in-year spending, procurement, public assets 
and liabilities. 
The legal framework does not provide for public participation in the budget process and 
is generally inadequate to support transparency and accountability. 
 
Clarity of roles and responsibilities 
The Constitution assigns roles and responsibilities to the different arms of government in 
the budget process. However, it does not clarify the role of the various departments in the 
executive in budget preparation and implementation. 
 
Contesting interpretations of the constitutional provisions and a lack of clarity around the 
role of departments has led to friction and an overlapping of functions in practice. 
The roles and responsibilities of the legislature remain unclear, leading to conflict and 
frequent delays. 
 
Resources allocated to sub-national government by the Constitution do not match the 
enormous responsibilities assigned to them. 
 
The poor definition of roles and responsibilities undermines transparency in the budget 
process and obscures public accountability. 
Public availability of information 
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Budget preparation in Nigeria is a closed process, falling exclusively within the 
responsibility of non- elected members of the executive. 
 
Available budget information is not comprehensive enough and lacks adequate 
classification. In general, information on actual spending by government is irregular, 
incoherent and inadequate. 
The reliability of budget information is questionable, marked by significant discrepancies 
between projected and actual expenditure. 
 
Budget information is not explicitly linked to policy objectives and contains very little 
background on expenditure areas, assumptions and priorities. 
 
Capacity and systems in the budget process 
While some improvements are apparent, current financial management systems in 
Nigeria fall short of ensuring transparency in the budget process. 
 
There is a lack of capacity for effective fiscal management in the Department of 
Finance’s Budget Office, with a severe shortage of skilled staff and inadequate office 
infra-structure. 
 
The departments dealing with financial management within the respective ministries 
similarly lack the skills and equipment needed to carry out their responsibilities. 
The office of the auditor general confirmed a corresponding lack of capacity and 
resources, including inadequate information and accounting systems. 
 
There is poor co-ordination between different agencies charged with budget monitoring, 
leading to ineffective control and accountability. 
 
Parliament lacks the capacity and skills to undertake thorough budget analysis and 
monitoring. However, it has increased its efforts to hold the executive accountable for the 
reform of critical systems in the budget process. 
 
MANAGEMENT OF EXTRA-BUDGETARY ACTIVITIES 
Nigeria has a large public enterprise sector, with an on-going privatisation process 
underway. There are also a number of government-owned public financial institutions 
and contingent liabilities that fall within the sphere of extra-budgetary activities. 
 
There is no legal requirement in Nigeria for the systematic publication of information on 
these extra-budgetary activities. No information at all is available about the accounts of 
some extra-budgetary funds. For others, records are kept independently by separate 
government agencies without any form of reconciliation. 
 
Not all off-budget funds are open to public audit because they fall outside the mandate of 
the auditor general. 
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There are no known rules governing deposits into and withdrawals from various accounts 
and funds. 
 
PARTICIPATION IN THE BUDGET PROCESS 
Donor agencies participate in the budget process as experts on strategies for budget 
implementation and fiscal management. They also have units that monitor the 
implementation of grants, loans or funds donated to government. 
 
Civil society participation in the budget process is weak. There are generally few access 
points for groups and individuals to engage with the process. 
 






FISCAL TRANSPARENCY research team in NIGERIA 
Theresearch wasconductedbySoji ApampaandTundeOni. Bothworkwith Integrity, a Nigerian 
civil societyorganisationadvocatingtheprotectionandpromotionof human rights against 
corruption. 
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